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PRIVATE POLICING OF MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS: AN EMPIRICAL
ASSESSMENT OF INSTITUTIONAL LEAD PLAINTIFFS IN TRANSACTIONAL
CLASS AND DERIVATIVE ACTIONS
BY DAVID H. WEBBER*
Transactional class and derivative actions have long been
controversial in both the popular and the academic literatures. Yet, the
debate over such litigation has thus far neglected to consider a change in
legal technology, adopted in Delaware a dozen years ago, favoring
selection of institutional investors as lead plaintiffs in these cases. This
Article fills that gap, offering new insights into the utility of mergers and
acquisitions litigation. Based on a hand-collected dataset of all
Delaware class and derivative actions filed from November 1, 2003 to
December 31, 2009, I find that institutional investors play as large of a
role in these cases as they do in federal securities fraud class actions,
leading 41% of them. Controlling for the size of the deal and other
factors, institutions have been more likely to assume a lead role in cases
with lower premiums over the trading price, at least until the collapse of
Lehman Brothers in September 2008, at which point most institutional
types increased their litigation activity and sued in higher premium deals
too.
Other case and deal characteristics significantly predict
institutional lead plaintiffs, such as the number of complaints filed in the
case (an illustration of lead plaintiff competitiveness), the length of the
complaint (a measure of attorney effort), whether the transaction is cash-

*
Associate Professor of Law, Boston University Law School. I would like to thank
Former Chancellor William Chandler of the Delaware Court of Chancery, and Kenneth
Lagowski, Office Manager for the Register in Chancery, for facilitating access to the data
analyzed in this paper. For many insights and comments, I thank Bill Allen, Alan Feld, Keith
Hylton, Marcel Kahan, Michael Klausner, Michael Perino, Adam Pritchard, Roberta Romano,
Natalya Shnitser, Lynn Stout, Randall Thomas, Fred Tung, David I. Walker and participants at
the Seventh Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies at Stanford Law School (2012),
the Canadian Law and Economics Association Conference at the University of Toronto
Faculty of Law (2012), Berle IV: The Future of Securities/Financial Markets at University
College London (2012), the Corporate Law and Policy Seminar at the New York University
School of Law (2012), the Sixth Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies at
Northwestern University School of Law (2011), and the Boston University School of Law
Faculty Workshop (2011). I would also like to thank Arcangelo Cella, Seongyeon Chang,
Nicholas DiLorenzo, Andrew Dunning, Caroline Cuddihee Holda, Patrick Gilbert, Daniel
Jeng, Huailu Li, Molly Muzevich, Russ Neldam, Joanne Oleksyk, Ian Peck, and Stuart Duncan
Smith for excellent research assistance.

1

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1879647

2

DELAWARE JOURNAL OF CORPORATE LAW

[Vol. 38

for-stock, the market capitalization of the target, and the presence of
"Go-Shop" provisions (which negatively correlate with institutional lead
plaintiffs). I also find that public-pension funds, in particular, target
controlling shareholder transactions.
I present evidence that public-pension funds, alone among
institutional types, statistically significantly correlate with the outcomes
of greatest interest to shareholders—both an increase in the offer price
and lower attorneys' fees. The improvement in offer price associated
with public-pension funds may be because they are better shareholder
representatives. It may also be because they "cherry-pick" the best
cases, although I offer some evidence against this hypothesis. These
results are consistent with the view that public-pension funds outperform
traditional lead plaintiffs as monitors of class counsel and that they
reduce agency costs for shareholders in mergers-and-acquisitions
litigation.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The debate over transactional class and derivative actions
continues to rage both inside and outside academia.1 In the most typical
case, the shareholders of the target company sue the target's board of
directors and the board of the acquirer.2 Often, the shareholders allege
that the target board, aided and abetted by the acquirer, breached its
Revlon duties by failing to maximize the price for the target's shares.3
Complaints in such cases tend to include allegations that material
information about the transaction has not been disclosed, and that the
defendants have consented to coercive deal terms that stifle the bidding
process or otherwise force the target shareholders to accept a low bid.4
Popular and academic commentators are divided over the utility of
such litigation.5 Some have argued that every deal faces litigation, that

1

See, e.g., C.N.V. Krishnan, et al., Shareholder Litigation in Mergers and
Acquisitions, 18 J. CORP. FIN. 1248, 1265 (2012) ("[T]he expected rise in takeover premia
[from deals litigation] more than offsets the fall in the probability of deal completion.");
Robert M. Daines & Olga Koumrian, Merger Lawsuits Yield High Costs and
Questionable
Benefits,
N.Y.
TIMES,
June
8,
2012,
available
at
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/06/08/merger-lawsuits-yield-high-costs-and-questionablebenefits/ [hereinafter Daines & Koumrian, Merger Lawsuits] ("Litigation can be effective in
protecting shareholder interests in some deals, but questioning every deal seems to impose
excessive costs on the companies involved and their shareholders."); Jessica Silver-Greenberg,
Why Merger Lawsuits Don't Pay, WALL ST. J., Aug. 27, 2011, available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111904009304576530742353849726.html
(observing that the number of merger lawsuits are growing but questioning whether the suits
"result in tangible awards").
2
See Daines & Koumrian, Merger Lawsuits, supra note 1 ("According to a study by
Cornerstone Research and Robert M. Daines, companies that were sold for more than $100
million in 2010 and 2011 reported more than 1,500 lawsuits filed against them and the
directors of the target companies.").
3
Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986)
("[When] the break-up of the company [is] inevitable . . . . [t]he duty of the
board . . . change[s] from the preservation of [the company] as a corporate entity to the
maximization of the company's value at a sale for the stockholders' benefit.").
4
See Krishnan et al., supra note 1, at 1248; Robert B. Thompson & Randall S.
Thomas, The New Look of Shareholder Litigation: Acquisition-Oriented Class Actions, 57
VAND. L. REV. 133, 144 (2004).
5
Compare Daines & Koumrian, Merger Lawsuits, supra note 1 (noting that while
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the overwhelming majority of such cases are frivolous, that the only
people who benefit from these cases are the lawyers, and that the costs of
these suits outweigh their benefits to shareholders.6 Others have taken
the opposite view, that the litigation costs are overblown and that
shareholders benefit from such litigation.7 But what has been missing
from this debate is an assessment of this litigation in light of a crucial
change in legal technology, adopted in Delaware over a decade ago,
favoring the selection of institutional investors as lead plaintiffs.8 This
legal innovation was designed to address several of the critiques of such
litigation, but its implementation has never been empirically assessed.9
This Article fills that gap. It makes clear, as demonstrated below, that
there are multiple tiers of transactional litigation, and that a nuanced
assessment of its merits should account for the identity of the lead
plaintiffs—whether they are individuals or institutions—and of equal if
not greater importance, what type of institutions they are.10
This decade-old innovation in mergers-and-acquisitions litigation
in Delaware, which has long served as the main arena for such cases,11
was part of a broader paradigm shift in aggregate shareholder litigation,
originating with a seminal law review article, Let The Money Do The
Monitoring: How Institutional Investors Can Reduce Agency Costs in
litigation is sometimes necessary and valuable, challenging every deal is unlikely to be in
shareholder interests), with Thompson & Thomas, supra note 4, at 207 ("[Although]
[s]hareholder litigation has often been cast in the role of the evil stepsister of modern corporate
governance . . . . the acquisition-oriented shareholder class actions filed in Delaware add value,
even if they also have costs.").
6
See Daines & Koumrian, Merger Lawsuits, supra note 1; see also Elliott J. Weiss &
Lawrence J. White, File Early, Then Free Ride: How Delaware Law (Mis)Shapes Shareholder
Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1797, 1806 (2004) ("Delaware law relating to mergers and
class actions created a litigation environment that was rife with potential for opportunistic
behavior by the plaintiffs' bar[,] . . . plaintiffs' attorneys generally responded by behaving
opportunistically[,] and . . . Delaware's courts did not effectively protect corporations or their
shareholders from the resulting litigation-related agency costs.").
7
See Thompson & Thomas, supra note 4, at 140 ("Placing our findings in the historical
context of the debate over the value of representative shareholder litigation, we believe that
acquisition-oriented class actions substantially reduce management agency costs, while the
litigation agency costs they create do not appear excessive.").
8
See e.g., TCW Tech. Ltd. P'ship v. Intermedia Commc'ns, Inc., 2000 WL 1654504, at
*4 (Del. Ch. Oct. 17, 2000) (holding that the institutional shareholders should serve as lead
plaintiff).
9
See infra pp. 29-31.
10
See infra Part V.
11
See ROBERT M. DAINES & OLGA KOUMRIAN, CORNERSTONE RESEARCH,
SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION INVOLVING MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS—FEBRUARY 2013
UPDATE 4-6 (2013), available at http://www.cornerstone.com/getattachment/199b1351-aba04f6d-92f0-24b50f4a4b29/ shareholder-Litigation-Involving-Mergers-and-Acqui.aspx.
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Securities Class Actions.12 In this Article, Elliot Weiss and John
Beckerman argued that courts should favor selection of institutional
investors as lead plaintiffs in federal securities fraud class actions.13
Weiss and Beckerman argued that financially and legally savvy
institutional investors with large stakes in the outcome of the case would
have both the motivation and sophistication to litigate thoroughly and
monitor class counsel.14 In contrast, the unsophisticated individual lead
plaintiffs who dominated class actions at that time had little incentive or
ability to monitor class counsel because they had small stakes in their
cases and were often hand-picked by plaintiffs' lawyers.15 In 1995,
Congress enshrined the Weiss and Beckerman proposal in the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act ("PSLRA").16 Five years later, the
Delaware Court of Chancery adopted a similar presumption, favoring
selection of institutional-investor lead plaintiffs in mergers-andacquisitions class and derivative actions.17
The emergence of institutional-investor lead plaintiffs in federal
securities fraud class actions has been studied in numerous academic
articles, including two by this Author.18 This is the first piece to examine
their role in the context of mergers-and-acquisitions cases, which differ
in fundamental respects from securities fraud class actions;19 we should

12

Elliot J. Weiss & John S. Beckerman, Let the Money Do the Monitoring: How
Institutional Investors Can Reduce Agency Costs in Securities Class Actions, 104 YALE L.J.
2053, 2126-27 (1995).
13
Id. at 2105 ("Courts would benefit [if] institutional investors with large stakes in
class actions [were] to serve as lead plaintiffs.").
14
Id. at 2095 ("Institutions' large stakes give them an incentive to monitor, and
institutions have or readily could develop the expertise necessary to assess whether plaintiffs'
attorneys are acting as faithful champions for the plaintiff class.").
15
Id. at 2054 ("[A]ttorneys operating on a contingent fee basis initiate most such suits
in the names of 'figurehead' plaintiffs with little at stake.").
16
15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (2006).
17
See TCW Tech. P'ship v. Intermedia Commc'ns, Inc., 2000 WL 1654504, at *4 (Del.
Ch. Oct. 17, 2000) ("[I]t seems appropriate, at least, to give recognition to large shareholders
or significant institutional investors who are willing to litigate vigorously on behalf of an entire
class of shareholders, provided no economic or other conflicts exist between the institutional
shareholder and smaller, more typical shareholders.").
18
See David H. Webber, The Plight of the Individual Investor in Securities Class
Actions, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 157 (2012) [hereinafter Webber, Plight]; David H. Webber, Is
"Pay-to-Play" Driving Public Pension Fund Activism in Securities Class Actions?, 90 B.U. L.
REV. 2031 (2010) [hereinafter Webber, Pay-to-Play].
19
Some of the most obvious differences between securities fraud class actions and
mergers-and-acquisitions class actions include that the former very often run parallel to SEC
or other governmental investigations, and involve accounting restatements. See infra notes
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not assume that a successful innovation in one of these types of litigation
can automatically be transplanted to the other. I elaborate upon this
point below.20
This Article aims to answer three primary questions pertaining to
institutional-investor leadership of deal cases in Delaware. First, have
institutions accepted Delaware's invitation to serve as lead plaintiffs, and
if so, what case and deal characteristics attract them? 21 Second, are
certain types of institutions—subdivided into public-pension funds,
labor-union funds, mutual funds, and the catchall "private non-mutual
funds"—more inclined to litigate period, or to litigate certain types of
cases or deals?22 Third, do institutions generally, and certain types of
institutions specifically, correlate with better case outcomes for
shareholders?23 To offer short answers to each of these questions, I find
that: first, institutions have obtained 41% of lead plaintiff appointments
since Delaware adopted a rule favoring their selection,24 and they tend to
obtain these appointments in cases where shareholders are offered low
premiums and comparatively unfavorable deal terms. 25 Presumably,
these are the cases we would want them to litigate, ex ante. Second,
there is some variation between institutional types regarding the deal and
case characteristics with which they are affiliated.26 For example, public121-22 and accompanying text. Institutional lead plaintiffs and their lawyers are frequently
accused of free riding off of these governmental investigations in securities fraud class actions.
See infra note 123 and accompanying text. Such governmental investigations are much less
frequent in the context of mergers-and-acquisitions litigation, depriving institutions and their
law firms of the free ride they may or may not enjoy in 10b-5 cases. See UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, AGENCIES, http://www.justice.gov/agencies/index-list.html (last
visited Jan. 17, 2014) (the DOJ investigates securities fraud through the US Attorney’s Office,
but only investigates antitrust elements of mergers and acquisitions); see also UNITED STATES
SECURITIES
AND
EXCHANGE COMMISSION, ENFORCEMENT DIVISION, About
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/enforce/about.htm (last visited Jan. 17, 2014) (discussing the
SEC’s role in investigating securities fraud but not discussing mergers and acquisitions or
investigation under the Williams Act); see also DELAWARE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL, Fraud Division, http://attorneygeneral.delaware.gov/office/fraud.shtml (last visited
Jan. 17, 2014) (discussing investigation into securities fraud but not discussing investigation
into mergers and acquisitions). Moreover, securities fraud class actions often accompany
voluntary financial restatements by the company, which are often tantamount to an admission
of liability. See infra notes 129-30 and accompanying text. Similar admissions of wrongdoing
rarely occur in the transactional litigation context. See infra note 126 and accompanying text.
20
See discussion infra pp. 20-22.
21
See infra Parts IV.A, V.
22
See infra Part V.B.
23
See infra notes 431, 484 and accompanying text.
24
See infra note 184 and accompanying text.
25
See infra p. 74-77.
26
See discussion infra Part V.B.
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pension funds target controlling-shareholder acquisitions.27 Third, I find
evidence that public-pension funds—alone among institutional types—
correlate with improved share price and lower attorneys' fees for target
shareholders.28 Given that these funds constitute the most frequent
institutional lead plaintiffs,29 their case selection and case performance
offer some support for the policy favoring selection of institutionalinvestor lead plaintiffs.
In addressing these questions, this Article advances two lines of
corporate law scholarship: the shareholder-activism literature, and the
shareholder-litigation literature.30 First, it advances the scholarship on
shareholder activism, which focuses on the objectives, methods, and
circumstances under which investors—particularly institutional
investors—engage corporate boards and fellow shareholders for the
purpose of influencing the business decisions or governance structures of
corporations.31 Litigation has commonly been understood as one form of
shareholder activism, albeit an extreme and confrontational form.32
Below, I argue that institutional participation in mergers-and-acquisitions
litigation is a form of shareholder activism, and is best understood in
light of the prior research on such activism. 33 This literature helps
contextualize why certain institutional types pursue (or avoid) lead
plaintiff appointments in deal litigation, and what types of cases we
might expect them to select.34 Second, the shareholder-litigation
literature helps frame the data presented here within the larger debate
over the utility of mergers-and-acquisitions litigation, and shareholder

27

See infra pp. 55-56.
See infra Part VI.A, C.
29
See infra Table 2.
30
See infra Part III.
31
See John Armour & Brian R. Cheffins, The Rise and Fall (?) of Shareholder
Activism By Hedge Funds 2 (European Corporate Governance Institute, Working Paper No.
136/2009, September 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1489336 [hereinafter
Armour & Cheffins, Rise and Fall] ("Shareholder activism has been described as 'the exercise
and enforcement of rights by minority shareholders with the objective of enhancing
shareholder value over the long term.'" (quoting Chee Keong Low, A Road Map for Corporate
Governance in East Asia, 25 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 165, 186 (2004))).
32
See Stephen J. Choi & Jill E. Fisch, On Beyond CalPERS: Survey Evidence on the
Developing Role of Public Pension Funds in Corporate Governance, 61 VAND. L. REV. 315,
316 (2008) (summarizing CalPERS' monitoring of securities fraud class action suits and
"influential role in the high-profile Cendant litigation" as a model of institutional activism).
33
See infra at III.B.
34
See infra at III.B.
28
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litigation generally.35 It helps assess the performance of institutional
investors in the lead plaintiff role, specifically, whether the lead plaintiffs
adequately represent the class, and whether they successfully select and
monitor class counsel.36 Do the lead plaintiffs control class counsel, or
does class counsel control the lead plaintiffs? As discussed more fully
below, I find some evidence that institutions appear to be exercising
judgment independent of their lawyers;37 the finding that public-pension
funds correlate with lower attorneys' fees38 is also particularly important.
Thus, this Article takes the natural next step in developing these two
lines of corporate law scholarship.
The Article proceeds as follows:
Part II provides some
background on transactional litigation and discusses Delaware law for
selecting lead plaintiffs in such cases, comparing it to federal law.39 Part
III contextualizes this Article within the shareholder litigation and
shareholder activism literatures, as noted above.40 Part IV describes the
sample and basic statistics.41 Part V discusses the case characteristics
associated with institutional lead plaintiffs generally, and with various
types of institutional lead plaintiffs specifically, public-pension funds,
labor-union funds, mutual funds, and private non-mutual funds.42 Part VI
analyzes the relationship between institutional lead plaintiffs, plaintiffs'
law firms, case characteristics, and case outcomes.43 A brief conclusion
follows.44

35

See infra at III.B.
See infra at III.B.
37
See infra Part VI.A.
38
See infra Part VI.C.
39
See infra Part II.
40
See infra Part III.
41
See infra Part IV.
42
See infra Part V.
43
See infra Part VI.
44
See infra Part VII.
36
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II. THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SELECTING INSTITUTIONAL LEAD
PLAINTIFFS IN DELAWARE AND BEYOND
A. Delaware Law for Selecting Lead Plaintiffs in Transactional Class
and Derivative Actions
In TCW Technology Limited Partnership v. Intermedia
Communications, Inc., the Delaware Court of Chancery established
criteria for the selection of lead plaintiffs and lead counsel in Delaware
transactional class and derivative actions.45 The court developed these
criteria in response to a lead plaintiff contest between three sets of
claimants: traditional shareholder claimants, institutional shareholder
claimants, and derivative claimants.46 Although the Delaware Court of
Chancery traditionally resisted becoming embroiled in lead plaintiff
disputes, encouraging the contestants to reach an agreement on their
own,47 in TCW Technology, the parties could not agree, forcing the court
to decide.48 In its opinion, the Delaware Court of Chancery noted that,
"[o]ver the past ten years, members of the Court of Chancery have been
asked, with increasing frequency, to become involved in the sometimes
unseemly internecine struggles within the plaintiffs' bar over the power
to control, direct and (one suspects) ultimately settle shareholder lawsuits
filed in this jurisdiction."49 The court held that in making the lead
plaintiff selection, it should consider the following factors: (1) "the
quality of the pleading that appears best able to represent the interests of
the shareholder class and derivative plaintiffs[;]" (2) which "shareholder
plaintiff has the greatest economic stake in the outcome of the lawsuit[;]"
and (3) "whether a particular litigant has prosecuted its lawsuit with
greater energy, enthusiasm or vigor than have other similarly situated
litigants."50 The opinion notes that the second factor "is similar to the
federal system that now uses a model whereby the class member with the
largest economic interest in the action is given responsibility to control

45
TCW Tech. Ltd. P'ship v. Intermedia Commc'ns, Inc., 2000 WL 1654504, at *4 (Del.
Ch. Oct. 17, 2000).
46
Id. at *1.
47
See id. at *3.
48
Id. ("[The] attempt to encourage a similar compromise of competing interests in
these shareholder actions, unfortunately, has failed.").
49
TCW Tech., 2000 WL 1654504, at *3.
50
Id. at *4.
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the litigation."51 In applying these criteria, Chancellor Chandler selected
two institutional investors as co-lead plaintiffs.52
In June 2002, the Delaware Court of Chancery settled on final
criteria for lead plaintiff selection.53 In Hirt v. U.S. Timberlands Service
Company, LLC, the court held that it would consider the following
factors: (1) the "quality of the pleading[;]" (2) "the relative economic
stakes of the competing litigants . . . (to be accorded 'great weight');" (3)
"the willingness and ability of the contestants to litigate vigorously on
behalf of an entire class of shareholders;" (4) "the absence of any conflict
between larger, often institutional, shareholders and smaller
shareholders;" (5) "the enthusiasm or vigor with which the various
contestants have prosecuted the lawsuit;" and (6) "competence of counsel
and their access to the resources necessary to prosecute the claims at
issue."54
As I demonstrate below, the "great weight" accorded to the relative
economic stakes of the contestants has ushered in a period of substantial
participation of institutional-investor lead plaintiffs in Delaware, in some
ways paralleling the increased participation of these investors in federal
securities fraud class actions.55 But even though they share the same
objectives, there are meaningful differences between the PSLRA
standard and Delaware law.56 The PSLRA created a rebuttable
presumption that "the most adequate plaintiff . . . is the person or group
of persons that . . . in the determination of the court, has the largest
financial interest in the relief sought by the class[.]"57 In adopting this
provision, Congress endeavored "to increase the likelihood that
institutional investors will serve as lead plaintiffs."58 Congress believed
that plaintiff-attorney agency costs could be reduced if the lead plaintiff

51

Id.; accord 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (2006).
TCW Tech., 2000 WL 1654504 at *4 ("Based on these considerations, I conclude
that the institutional shareholders . . . should serve as lead plaintiff, with all of the other
shareholder actions consolidated with the two institutional lawsuits for purposes of the
scheduled preliminary injunction hearing.").
53
Hirt v. U.S. Timberlands Serv. Co., 2002 WL 1558342, at *2 (Del. Ch. July 9, 2002).
54
Id.
55
See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERSLLP, 2011 SEC. LITIG. STUD. 27 (Apr.
2012), available at http://www.pwc.com/en_US/us/forensic-services/publications/assets/2011securities-litigation-study.pdf (noting that institutional investors, including public and union
pension funds, represented 38% of the lead plaintiffs in securities cases filed in 2011).
56
See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I)(bb)-(cc).
57
15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I)(bb).
58
S. Rep. No. 104-98, at 11 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 690.
52
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had a large enough stake in the outcome to be incentivized to monitor
class counsel, and if the lead plaintiff were sufficiently sophisticated to
act on its incentive skillfully.59
Probably the most meaningful difference between the PSLRA and
Delaware law is that Delaware's "relative economic stakes" language is
more flexible than the federal standard because it can be read to let
courts assess the size of the lead plaintiff applicant's stake both
absolutely and relative to its own portfolio.60 For example, in In re Del
Monte Foods, the court, for several reasons, selected as lead plaintiff a
pension trust that owned 25,000 shares worth $475,000 and representing
0.07% of its assets under management instead of a European asset
manager for private and institutional clients that held 1,899,900 shares
worth $36 million and representing 0.02% of its assets under
management.61 Despite the latter applicant's far larger absolute stake, the
relative stakes of the two applicants were approximately equal.62 In
contrast, the PSLRA created a rebuttable presumption that the entity with
the largest absolute stake in the case is the presumptive lead plaintiff,
even if that stake represents a trivial investment for the applicant.63 As I
have argued elsewhere, I view the flexibility of the Delaware approach as
superior to the federal approach because it implicitly acknowledges that a
lead plaintiff's incentive to monitor class counsel—a key role of a lead
plaintiff—may be a function of how important the investment is to that
lead plaintiff, relative to its entire investment portfolio.64 But despite this
comparative advantage, I maintain that, in practice, the Delaware process
for selecting a lead plaintiff omits a vital step in screening lead plaintiffs.
The Delaware process does not require disclosure of, and makes no effort

59
See id. (demonstrating intent to increase the likelihood that institutional investors be
chosen as lead plaintiff); see also Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 12, at 2105-06 (suggesting
the basis for the "most adequate plaintiff" provision).
60
See Webber, Plight, supra note 18, at 171 ("[I]n contrast to federal courts'
congressional mandate to favor lead plaintiffs with the largest absolute loss, Delaware's
'relative economic stakes' language has opened the possibility for selection of a lead plaintiff
with the largest loss relative to its own assets.").
61
In re Del Monte Foods Co. S'holders Litig., 2010 WL 5550677, at *6 (Del. Ch. Dec.
31, 2010).
62
Id. at *6-*7.
63
Id. at *5.
64
See Webber, Plight, supra note 18, at 171 ("[I]n In re Del Monte Foods Co.
Shareholders Litigation, Vice Chancellor Laster noted the size of lead plaintiff applicants'
losses relative to their overall assets under management in selecting a lead plaintiff that had a
smaller absolute but larger relative loss. . . . In re Del Monte [establishes] that the incentive to
monitor class counsel stems, at least in part, from the relative size of the investor's loss.").
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to assess, lead plaintiff applicants' stakes in the bidder(s).65 It only
assesses their stakes in the target.66
As a lead plaintiff, an institutional investor should typify the class
of target shareholders and zealously advocate on its behalf.67 "The
institution must strive to maximize the price paid for the class's shares by
the acquirer, augment disclosures, and create an open bidding process in
the hope that the class will benefit from a bidding war."68 But as I have
noted in prior work, "institutional investors' interests may run counter to
these objectives" when they also hold shares in the acquiring company.69
"The dollars they win as members of the target class are dollars they lose
as an acquirer shareholder, and vice versa. If the institutional investors'
stake in the acquirer is greater than their stake in the target, their net
financial incentive is to lower the bidding price, not increase it."70 It is
true that, in most instances, the self-interest of institutional-investor lead
plaintiff applicants, combined with the fiduciary responsibilities of
representing the target-shareholder class, should incentivize the
institutions to correctly calibrate their interests in the target and the
acquirer on their own, without disclosure.71
Still, the lack of disclosure may cause problems. It may cause
institutions not to check what their stake in the acquirer is, not least
because the plaintiffs' attorneys monitoring their portfolios have no
incentive to check, and because it may be difficult to assess the size of
their stake if the fund utilizes many outside investment managers. 72
Moreover, funds that have a larger stake in the bidder than the target
might proceed in the lead plaintiff role anyway because of private

65

See id. at 207 (noting that an institution should not serve as a lead plaintiff if its
financial interest in the bidder outweighs its interest in the target).
66
See id.
67
See DEL CT. CH. R. 23(a)(3) ("One or more members of a class may sue or be sued
as representative parties on behalf of all only if . . . the claims or defenses of the representative
parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class . . . .").
68
Webber, Plight, supra note 18, at 206. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes
Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 184 (Del. 1986) (creating a duty for the board to get the best
possible price for the shareholders once the company is for sale). But cf. Barkan v. Amsted
Indus., Inc., 567 A.2d 1279, 1286 (Del. 1989) (holding that the fulfillment of Revlon duties
during a change of control does not always require the administration of an auction).
69
Webber, Plight, supra note 18, at 206.
70
Id.
71
See In re Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., 404 F.3d 173, 198 (3d Cir. 2005) (noting lead
plaintiffs are fiduciaries for the class they represent).
72
See Webber, Plight, supra note 18, at 167 (discussing institutions' portfoliomonitoring arrangements with plaintiffs' law firms).

2014]

PRIVATE POLICING OF MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS

13

benefits to its own board members, such as favorable publicity for a
pension fund trustee who is an elected official.73 And in the extreme
case, institutions with a stake in the bidder that exceeds the target might
even obtain a lead plaintiff appointment for the purpose of thwarting the
litigation.74 This might seem farfetched, but the market has seen similar
mercenary behavior in the empty-voting context.75 In a previous article, I
proposed a mechanism by which courts should require disclosure of a
prospective lead plaintiff's position in the acquirer, as well as in the
target, and for disqualifying the proposed lead plaintiff under certain
circumstances.76
I raise this issue here because it is possible that institutional lead
plaintiffs' bidder stakes could predict the cases they pursue, and their
performance.77
This Article offers no analysis of this potential
explanatory variable because the data is unavailable.78 I note that, if it
were available, it might well reveal that the lead plaintiff applicant's
stake in the bidder plays little or no role as an explanatory variable

73

See id. at 207 ("[P]oliticians serving on a fund's board might win favorable publicity
by using the fund's lead plaintiff status to win concessions from the bidder in favor of the
target, particularly if the target is located within the politician's constituency and employs
voters.").
74
See id. at 208 ("[A]n institutional investor could obtain lead plaintiff status for the
purpose of thwarting the litigation.").
75
See e.g., Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard Black, The New Vote Buying: Empty Voting and
Hidden (Morphable) Ownership, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 811, 816 (2006) (describing instances of
insiders and hedge funds using derivative investments to decouple voting rights and economic
stakes in order to achieve a result contrary to the interests of shareholders whose voting and
economic rights were integrated).
76
See Webber, Plight, supra note 18, at 207 (proposing that an institution should not
serve as a lead plaintiff if its financial interest in the bidder outweighs its interest in the target).
77
See id. at 167 (noting that better outcomes result for shareholders in securities class
actions when institutional investors serve as lead plaintiffs).
78
One potential source of this data is the Form 13-Fs that institutional investors with
assets in excess of $100 million are required to file with the SEC. See Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 § 13(f), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(f) (2012); U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION, FORM 13F—REPORTS FILED BY INSTITUTIONAL INVESTMENT MANAGERS,
available at http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/files/2012/03/Cornerstone_Research_Shareh
older_MandA_Litigation_03_2012.pdf. But Form 13-Fs have been filed for virtually none of
the public-pension funds in my sample because most of these funds utilize outside investment
managers, often several outside managers, and it is these investment managers—and not the
funds themselves—that file the Form 13-Fs. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 13(f), 15
U.S.C. § 78m(f)(1) (2012) (establishing that institutional investment managers are responsible
for filing such reports with the Commission). Investment manager Form 13-Fs do not reveal
the amount of their clients' funds that are invested in particular stocks. See C.S. Agnes Cheng
et al., Institutional Monitoring Through Shareholder Litigation, 95 J. FIN. ECON. 356, 362 n.21
(2010).
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because institutional investors have strong economic and legal incentives
not to take a lead plaintiff role representing a shareholder class that is
actually litigating against its interests, as outlined above.79 But one
cannot exclude the possibility that bidder stake could impact case
selection and performance.80
III. PRIOR LITERATURE
As noted in the Introduction, this Article sits at the intersection of
two strains of corporate law scholarship: the shareholder-litigation
literature, and the shareholder-activism literature.81
The relevant
shareholder-activism literature focuses on the types of institutional
investors that engage in such activism and the types of activism they
engage in, ranging from litigation to proxy contests, say-on-pay
initiatives, or behind-the-scenes campaigns designed to influence the
direction or governance of a publicly-held company.82 The literature on
private securities and corporate litigation focuses on the agency costs of
class counsel, the deterrent and compensatory effects of such litigation,
and cost-benefit analyses of it.83 I will briefly outline these scholarly
domains. Later in this Article, I will rely upon them to interpret and
contextualize my data and its implications for further research.84
A. Private Securities and Deal Litigation
The purpose of private securities and transactional litigation is to
provide shareholders with a tool for policing a broad range of managerial
misconduct.85 It is well understood that the separation between corporate

79

See Webber, Plight, supra note 18, at 206.
See id. at 219 (noting that although better outcomes result for shareholders in
securities class actions when institutional investors serve as lead plaintiffs, this could be due to
"cherry-picking" the best cases).
81
See supra text accompanying note 30.
82
See Edward B. Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of Institutional
Shareholder Activism, 79 GEO. L.J. 445, 479, 482 (1991) (describing types of institutional
investors, including public-pension funds and private funds, and the types of activism they
engage in, including corporate governance proposals and proxy contests).
83
See e.g., Cheng et al., supra note 78, at 357 (describing agency costs, deterrent and
compensatory effects of litigation, and the cost-benefit analysis of securities litigation).
84
See supra Part VII.
85
See Thompson & Thomas, supra note 4, at 144-45 (concluding that securities class
actions, like state court shareholder suits, are generally brought over corporate governance and
80
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ownership and control generates agency costs, creating managerial
interests that are distinct from those of the shareholders.86 Delaware law
recognizes the potentially dramatic rise in such managerial agency costs
in the context of a merger or acquisition.87 For example, in responding to
a hostile offer, the board of directors may institute defensive measures
such as a poison pill to stop a transaction that would benefit
shareholders, but strip the board and management of the perks of their
positions.88 In a friendly deal, target managers may tolerate a lower price
in exchange for private benefits such as generous severance packages or
an employment contract with the new combined entity.89 In management
buyouts or controlling shareholder acquisitions, managers, and the board,
may both face direct conflicts of interest between negotiating a low
acquisition price for themselves or the controlling shareholder and
maximizing the price for shareholders.90
managerial performance).
86
See ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY 66 (Revised ed. 1968) (discussing how corporate development has led to
the separation of ownership and control); Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory
of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON.
305, 309 (1976) (explaining how agency costs are generated by the separation of corporate
ownership and control).
87
See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985) (declaring
that boards have an "enhanced duty" in the context of mergers-and-acquisitions because of the
"the omnipresent specter" that is a breach of the duty of loyalty to shareholders); see also
Thompson & Thomas, supra note 4, at 145 (stating that Delaware's imposition of additional
duties on directors in a merger context are due to the risk of increased agency costs in that
setting).
88
See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Exclusive Merger Agreements and Lock-Ups in
Negotiated Corporate Acquisitions, 75 MINN. L. REV. 239, 273 (1990) ("[I]f incumbent
management defeats the bidder, target directors and officers will retain their positions, but
target shareholders will lose a substantial premium for their shares."). See generally Lucian
Arye Bebchuk, The Case Against Board Veto in Corporate Takeovers, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 973
(2002) (providing a thorough treatment of the board's authority to block unsolicited bids).
89
See Thompson & Thomas, supra note 4, at 145 (explaining that in friendly
acquisitions there is the "constant fear" that target management will sell too cheaply in
exchange for personal benefits, such as severance packages or continued employment); see
also Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110,
118 (1965) (deducing that whenever there is a merger there is some side-payment to the target
management because they are in the position to garner almost all of the "control premium"
over the market price of the stocks for themselves). For an overview of litigated cases
involving private board member deal benefits, see also, Bainbridge, supra note 88, at 273-74
(providing overview of litigated cases involving private board member deal benefits).
90
See Thompson & Thomas, supra note 4, at 145; see also Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey
N. Gordon, Controlling Controlling Shareholders, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 785, 786 (2003-04)
(noting that controlling shareholders may exercise private benefits of control either by
squeezing out the minority shareholders or selling their controlling stake). But see Stephen M.
Bainbridge, Unocal at 20: Director Primacy in Corporate Takeovers, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 769,
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Delaware law offers several means of reducing such agency costs
in the transactional context. For instance, the boards of the target and the
acquirer, as well as a majority vote of the shareholders, must approve
friendly deals.91 In the absence of a conflict of interest, Delaware courts
apply the deferential business judgment rule to such transactions.92 In the
presence of such a conflict, like an acquisition by a controlling
shareholder, Delaware courts apply "entire fairness" review, a form of
scrutiny that is more stringent than the business judgment rule,
developed in a line of cases following Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.93 In the
mid-1980s, Delaware courts developed a level of intermediate scrutiny
between Weinberger "entire fairness" and the business judgment rule.94
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co. established this "enhanced
scrutiny," requiring that in a hostile bidder situation, defensive measures
instituted by an independent board must be instituted in response to a real
threat to the target and must be proportional to the threat.95 Finally, in
Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., Delaware courts
began developing a line of cases requiring the board to have a duty to
maximize the price for target shareholders in any sale of control of a
corporation.96 Target shareholders have standing to bring private class or
820 (2006) ("[T]he empirical evidence indicates shareholder premiums are essentially identical
in management-sponsored leveraged buyouts and arm's length leveraged buyouts."). See
generally John C. Easterwood, et al., Controlling the Conflict of Interest in Management
Buyouts, 76 REV. ECON. & STAT. 512 (1994) (providing an empirical analysis of the
effectiveness of various methods of combating the conflict of interest that arises when
managers bid to acquire the firms they manage).
91
See DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(b)-(c) (2010) (describing the procedure for the
board's adoption of a merger agreement); see also Thompson & Thomas, supra note 4, at 145.
92
See Thompson & Thomas, supra note 4, at 146.
93
See id. (discussing the application of entire fairness review to shareholder
transactions when a conflict of interest exists and crediting the Weinberger case as first
announcing this standard); see also Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983)
("When directors of a Delaware corporation are on both sides of a transaction, they are
required to demonstrate their utmost good faith and the most scrupulous inherent fairness of
the bargain.").
94
See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985) ("[A]n
enhanced duty which calls for judicial examination at the threshold before the protections of
the business judgment rule may be conferred."); see also Thompson & Thomas, supra note 4,
at 147 ("Beginning in 1985, the Delaware courts developed an intermediate standard of
review, more intrusive than the deferential business judgment rule, but short of the entire
fairness of Weinberger.").
95
493 A.2d at 955.
96
506 A.2d 173, 184 (Del. 1986); see also Thompson & Thomas, supra note 4 at 147
("The promise of the Revlon decision itself was that in any sale of corporate control, the target
company's board of directors had a duty to maximize shareholder value by taking the highest
price for the company.").
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derivative actions to enforce these rights against recalcitrant boards or
managers.97 Such private rights of action should reduce managerial
agency costs by forcing managers to act in the interests of shareholders
in the transactional context.
But litigation to enforce these rights generates costs of its own,
including agency costs created by the disconnect between the interests of
plaintiffs' lawyers and those of the shareholder class they represent.98
Much of the academic debate over such litigation focuses upon whether
it actually reduces managerial agency costs and, even if it does, whether
this benefit outweighs the litigation costs.99 For example, Daines and
Koumrian reviewed reports of mergers-and-acquisitions shareholder
litigation in SEC filings related to acquisitions of U.S. public companies
valued over $100 million and announced in 2010 or 2011.100 They found
that almost all of these transactions triggered several lawsuits, which
were "filed shortly after the deal's announcement and often settled before
the deal's closing."101 Few of these lawsuits resulted in tangible monetary
benefits to shareholders; most settled for additional disclosures or, less
frequently, changes to the terms of the deal.102 They also found that,
while requiring additional disclosures is a common outcome, there were
no cases in which shareholders rejected the deal after the additional
disclosures were provided.103 In another study, Cain and Davidoff

97
See Robert B. Thompson, Preemption and Federalism in Corporate Governance:
Protecting Shareholder Rights to Vote, Sell, and Sue, 62 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 215, 218
(1999).
98
See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs' Attorney's Role in Class
Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1, 19 (1991) (attributing high agency costs in class action and derivative litigation
primarily to the inability of the class to effectively monitor the attorneys).
99
Compare Thompson & Thomas, supra note 4, at 207 ("[W]e conclude that the
acquisition-oriented shareholder class actions filed in Delaware add value, even if they also
have costs."), with Daniel R. Fischel & Michael Bradley, The Role of Liability Rules and the
Derivative Suit in Corporate Law: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 71 CORNELL L.
REV. 261, 282 (1986) (concluding that derivative suits do not have a material impact on the
firm's managerial agency costs and its shareholders because of the insignificant magnitude of
the shareholder's wealth-effects).
100
ROBERT M. DAINES & OLGA KOUMRIAN, CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, RECENT
DEVELOPMENT
IN
SHAREHOLDER
LITIGATION
INVOLVING
MERGERS
AND
ACQUISITIONS—MARCH
2012
UPDATE
1
(2012),
available
at
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/files/2012/03/Cornerstone_Research_Shareholder_Mand
A_Litigation_03_2012.pdf.
101
Id. at 1.
102
Id. at 11.
103
Id.; see also Brittany M. Giusini, Note, Pure Resources' "Fair Summary" Standard:
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utilized a nationwide dataset and reported that, between 2005-2011, there
was a sharp increase in the percentage of transactions valued at more
than $100 million that were targeted by a lawsuit, from 39.3% to 92.1%,
raising concerns about the frivolousness of such litigation.104
In contrast, Krishnan, Masulis, Thomas, and Thompson ("KMTT")
examine merger activity from 1993 to 2001.105 Controlling for a variety
of factors, they found that mergers-and-acquisitions subject to litigation
were completed at a significantly lower rate than those not subject to
litigation.106 They also found that mergers-and-acquisitions subject to
shareholder litigation have significantly higher premiums in takeover
deals.107 And they found that, in merger waves with friendly singlebidder offers, shareholder litigation acts as a substitute for the presence
of a rival bidder by “polic[ing] low-ball bids and lead[ing] to improved
offer prices."108 Most importantly, they found that "the expected rise in
the takeover premia [for cases subjected to shareholder litigation] more
than offsets the fall in the probability of deal completion, resulting in a
positive expected gain to target shareholders."109 Thus, the KMTT article
provides evidence that deal litigation benefits shareholders.110 This
Article takes the next natural step in developing this line of scholarship
by assessing the types of lead plaintiffs in these cases,111 the case
characteristics associated with particular institutional types,112 whether
Delaware's policy favoring selection of institutional lead plaintiffs
improves outcomes for shareholders and whether certain types of
institutional investors are particularly effective in the lead plaintiff role.113
Although I am not aware of another article that assesses the role of
lead-plaintiff types in transactional litigation, some prior work has
examined their role in federal securities fraud class actions.114 Michael
Disclosures Away From Obtaining Clarity in the M&A Context, 38 DEL. J. CORP. L. 595, 61925 (2013) (discussing the costs and benefits of increasing disclosures in Delaware).
104
Matthew Cain & Steven Davidoff, A Great Game: The Dynamics of State
Competition
and
Litigation,
3
(January
2013),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1984758.
105
See Krishnan et al., supra note 1, at 1248.
106
Id. at 1265.
107
Id.
108
Id. at 1264.
109
Krishnan et al., supra note 1, at 1250.
110
Id. at 1264-65.
111
See discussion infra Part IV.
112
See discussion infra Part V.
113
See discussion infra Part VII.
114
See generally Michael Perino, Institutional Activism Through Litigation: An
Empirical Analysis of Public Pension Fund Participation in Securities Class Actions, 9 J.
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Perino found that, federal securities fraud class action cases with publicpension lead plaintiffs have larger investor recoveries and significantly
lower attorney fee requests and awards than cases with other lead
plaintiffs, even after controlling for institutional self-selection.115
Similarly, Cheng, Huang, Li and Lobo found that institutional owners
can use securities litigation as a disciplinary mechanism because
[securities class actions] with an institutional lead plaintiff
are less likely to be dismissed and have significantly larger
settlements. Further analysis indicates that all types of
institutions show significantly better litigation outcomes
with public pension funds generating the largest settlement
amount. We also found that, within three years of filing the
lawsuit, defendant firms with institutional lead plaintiffs
experience greater improvement in board independence than
those with individual lead plaintiffs.116
Similarly, Choi, Fisch and Pritchard found that, post-PSLRA, publicpension-fund lead plaintiffs correlate with higher recoveries in securities
fraud class actions;117 Cox, Thomas, and Bai similarly found higher
recoveries by both public-pension funds and labor-union funds.118 Thus,
these studies provide evidence that some institutional-investor lead
plaintiffs in securities fraud class actions, notably public-pension funds,
provide better shareholder outcomes in the form of higher settlements,
lower attorneys' fees, and improved board independence.119
Still, the substantial differences between transactional litigation
and securities fraud litigation should make one cautious before importing
the lessons from one form of litigation to the other.120 First, securities
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 368, 369-70 (2012).
115
Id. at 369.
116
Cheng et al., supra note 78, at 358.
117
See Stephen J. Choi, Jill E. Fisch & A.C. Pritchard, Do Institutions Matter? The
Impact of the Lead Plaintiff Provision of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 83
WASH. U. L.Q. 869, 895-96 (2005) [hereinafter Choi et al., Do Institutions Matter?] (analyzing
outcomes of securities fraud class actions post-PSLRA).
118
See James D. Cox, Randall S. Thomas & Lynn Bai, There Are Plaintiffs and . . .
There Are Plaintiffs: An Empirical Analysis of Securities Class Action Settlements, 61 VAND.
L. REV. 355, 379 (2008).
119
See Cheng et al., supra note 78, at 357-58; Choi et al., Do Institutions Matter?,
supra note 117, at 895-96; Cox et al., supra note 118, at 379; Perino, supra note 114, at 36970.
120
See supra note 19.
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fraud class actions led by institutional lead plaintiffs—and publicpension funds in particular—often correlate with the presence of a
simultaneous governmental investigation into the fraud.121 Typically,
these investigations are conducted by the SEC, though occasionally by
the U.S. Department of Justice or other government entities.122 This
correlation has led to speculation that public-pension funds and other
institutional investors "free ride" off of these investigations,123 although
some studies suggest that public-pension funds correlate with higher
settlements even when accounting for a government investigation.124 At
least one recent study has compared the market reaction to stand-alone
SEC investigations versus stand-alone private securities class actions, in
part to address claims that securities fraud class actions free ride off of
governmental investigations, adding little value of their own.125
Governmental investigations are virtually nonexistent in the context of
transactional litigation, and thus, there is no parallel investigation for
public-pensions or other institutions to free-ride on.126 Because I do find
that public-pension funds correlate with better outcomes for target
shareholders in deal litigation,127 this Article offers support for the view

121
See, e.g., Perino, supra note 114, at 379, 381 ("[P]ublic pension fund plaintiffs are
significantly more likely to be involved in . . . cases with parallel governmental enforcement
actions than noninstitutional plaintiffs.").
122
See James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Does the Plaintiff Matter? An Empirical
Analysis of Lead Plaintiffs in Securities Class Actions, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1587, 1589 n.8
(2006) (stating that the Securities and Exchange Commission and the U.S. Department of
Justice are capable of sanctioning violators).
123
See id. at 1605-06 (suggesting the potential for public-pension funds to free ride off
of government investigations to minimize the costs incurred).
124
See, e.g., id. at 1624, 1630-31 (finding that institutional lead plaintiffs correlate with
higher settlements even when controlling for an SEC investigation); Cox et al., supra note 118,
at 378-79 ("[S]ettlement size is positively and significantly correlated with . . . the presence of
an SEC enforcement action."); Perino, supra note 114, at 383-84 (finding a positive correlation
between public-pension funds securities litigation lead plaintiffs and settlement amounts while
controlling for governmental enforcement action).
125
See Stephen J. Choi & Adam C. Pritchard, SEC Investigations and Securities Class
Actions: An Empirical Comparison, 2, 4-5 (N.Y.U. Center for Law, Economics and
Organization, Working Paper No. 12-38, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2109739
(comparing market reaction to stand-alone SEC investigations versus SEC stand-alone
securities class actions and finding evidence that class actions are superior to SEC
investigations in targeting fraud and imposing sanctions on companies).
126
See SEC DIV. OF ENFORCEMENT, ENFORCEMENT MANUAL § 1.4.1 (2012),
available at http://www.sec.gov/divisions/enforce/enforcementmanual.pdf (describing the
SEC's mission as investigating and litigating only violations of federal securities laws).
127
See, e.g., Webber, Plight, supra note 18, at 167 ("Overall, the use of institutional
investors as lead plaintiffs correlates with better outcomes for shareholders in securities class
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that these funds can vindicate the rights of shareholders on their own,
without government help.128
Similarly, it has often been observed that institutional-investor
lead plaintiffs in federal securities fraud class actions, including publicpension funds, bring cases when the defendant company has voluntarily
restated its own financial statements because of accounting
deficiencies.129 In effect, such actions begin with an admission of
wrongdoing by the company, thereby greatly aiding securities fraud class
action plaintiffs in meeting their burden of proof on liability.130 But in
mergers-and-acquisitions litigation, no admission of wrongdoing akin to
a financial restatement occurs.131 Thus, studying such litigation affords
the opportunity to assess the effectiveness of public-pension fund lead
plaintiffs, and institutional lead plaintiffs generally, when they do not
have the benefit of an admission of wrongdoing as an alternative
explanation for their successes.
There are additional differences between securities fraud and
transactional class actions that caution against readily applying the
lessons of one form of litigation to the other. For example, as discussed
at length in this piece, diversified institutional investors may often find
themselves holding stakes in both target and bidder companies.132 Such
conflicting ownership stakes have the potential to create sharp conflicts
of interest between shareholders, and could undermine the policy
favoring selection of institutional-investor lead plaintiffs.133
Finally, the underlying transactions, the applicable substantive
law, and the economics of transactional class actions differ greatly from
actions . . . .").
128
See discussion supra Part IV.A.
129
See, e.g., Choi et al., Do Institutions Matter?, supra note 117, at 892 (finding
significant correlation between institutional lead plaintiffs and the presence of a fraud-related
earnings restatement or SEC investigation); see also Perino, supra note 114, at 379, 381
("[P]ublic pension fund plaintiffs are significantly more likely to be involved
in . . . RESTATEMENT cases . . . than noninstitutional plaintiffs.").
130
Compare Choi et al., Do Institutions Matter?, supra note 117, at 895 (excluding
accounting restatements unrelated to fraud), with Perino, supra note 114, at 378-79, 383
(including all restatements and concluding public-pension funds still correlate with better
outcomes for shareholders).
131
See supra note 19.
132
See infra notes 167-69 and accompanying text; see also Webber, Plight, supra note
18, at 205 (stating the possibility of institutional investors owning shares in bidder as well as
target companies).
133
See Webber, Plight, supra note 18, at 205-06 (discussing the conflict that exists
when institutional investors hold stakes in both target and bidder companies and the potential
for focus on the bidder company over the target company).
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securities fraud class actions.134 Transactional class actions require less
commitment of time and resources from both lead plaintiffs and lead
counsel for a number of reasons. For instance, they are not subject to the
onerous pleading requirements of the PSLRA, nor to the bar on
discovery prior to a motion to dismiss that so substantially increases the
costs to plaintiffs in federal securities fraud class actions.135 In addition,
the PSLRA creates a strong presumption that the lead plaintiff applicant
with the largest absolute loss be selected as the lead plaintiff.136 As
discussed earlier in Part II, Delaware law is more flexible, emphasizing
the "relative economic stakes" of the applicants.137 Consequently, lead
plaintiff selection may be less predictable in Delaware than at the federal
level, affecting both institutional case selection and outcomes. And
while no one enjoys being a defendant in any lawsuit, the stigma, if any,
that attaches to defendants for not abiding by Revlon would seem to have
less of a negative reputational impact than would an accusation of fraud.
No one goes to jail for violating Revlon. And while the threat of
withdrawal of insurance coverage due to actual fraud may impact the
dynamics of a securities fraud case, such threats are infrequent—if not
nonexistent—in the context of transactional class actions, where fraud is
rarely alleged.138
Thus, it is important to let the data tell the story of institutional
lead plaintiffs in transactional litigation. That story is told below. But
there is one final point to be made before it begins.

134

See infra notes 135-38 and accompanying text.
See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 319-21 (2007)
(presenting the heightened standards that apply to securities fraud class actions and
recognizing that ordinary civil actions only require a "short and plain statement" of their claim,
as is required under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2)).
136
See, e.g., Webber, Plight, supra note 18, at 166 ("As Congress intended, federal
courts have since interpreted the PSLRA's 'largest financial interest' clause to mean the largest
absolute loss. Thus, whichever individual or entity incurs the largest loss and moves for the
position becomes the presumptive lead plaintiff." (footnote omitted)).
137
See supra note 54 and accompanying text; see also Webber, Plight, supra note 18,
at 166 ("Delaware courts weigh the 'relative economic stakes' of competing lead plaintiff
movants in the outcome of the lawsuit, which suggests the possibility that the lead plaintiff that
has the most at stake relative to its own assets, and not on an absolute scale, could be
appointed lead plaintiff." (footnotes omitted)).
138
See Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, How the Merits Matter: Directors' and Officers'
Insurance and Securities Settlements, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 755, 802 (2009) (reporting that the
fraud exclusion of insurance policies is often raised in settlement talks and, therefore, does not
have the impact that would be anticipated).
135
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B. Shareholder Litigation As A Form of Shareholder Activism
"Shareholder activism has been described as 'the exercise and
enforcement of rights by minority shareholders with the objective of
enhancing shareholder value over the long term.'"139 Understanding the
landscape of institutional shareholder activism offers some context for
assessing what types of institutions one might expect to obtain lead
plaintiff appointments in transactional litigation, and why. The literature
divides shareholder activism into two broad categories: ex ante or
"offensive" activism and ex post or "defensive" activism.140 Ex ante or
offensive activists "first determine whether a company would benefit
from activism, then take a position and become active."141 Typically,
hedge funds fall into this category.142 Hedge funds profit by engaging in
targeted hedges rather than by diversifying.143 Among those funds that
engage in activism, it is likely that they do so as a principal investment
strategy, rather than an isolated effort.144 As Kahan and Rock put it,
"activism presumably entails learning, with funds that have done more of
it becoming better at it, and funds with an activist reputation more easily
attracting support from other investors and inducing management
changes."145 Such funds rely upon a value-investing approach, rather
than quantitative theories of finance.146 The managers of these funds are
often former investment bankers, seeking out underperforming assets to
invest in by studying balance sheets, income statements, and other
information.147 The managers' activist strategies might include "share

139

Armour & Cheffins, Rise and Fall, supra note 31, at 2 (quoting Low, supra note 31,

at 186).
140
See Brian R. Cheffins & John Armour, The Past, Present, and Future of
Shareholder Activism by Hedge Funds, 37 J. CORP. L. 51, 56-57 (2011) (describing the
difference between "offensive" and "defensive" shareholder activism).
141
Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and
Corporate Control, 155 U. PA. L. Rev. 1021, 1069 (2007).
142
See id.
143
See id. at 1070 ("[T]hey engage in targeted hedges, rather than diversification, to
eliminate unwanted risks.").
144
See, e.g., id. ("To be a successful activist, it is probably helpful for a fund to engage
in activism as a principal strategy . . . .").
145
Kahan & Rock, supra note 141, at 1070.
146
See Armour & Cheffins, Rise and Fall, supra note 31, at 3-4.
147
See e.g., id. at 4 (observing that managers of activist hedge funds analyze corporate
fundamentals to find underpriced and underperforming stock).
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buy-backs, spinoffs, mergers, or [changes to] the composition of the
board of directors[]."148
In contrast, ex post or "defensive" shareholder activism occurs
"when fund management notes that portfolio companies are
underperforming, or that their governance regime is
deficient . . . ."149
Such activists tend to be public-pension funds or labor-union funds, and
to a lesser extent, mutual funds.150
These investors employ
diversification strategies in which they seek to reduce, if not eliminate,
firm-specific risk while approximating a market rate of return.151 These
strategies reduce research costs and minimize investigation into
particular business decisions.152 Such funds may gain from activism that
improves profitability across markets as a whole, as "universal owners"
with long-term investment horizons to match long-term liabilities in the
form of retirement benefit payments.153 An ex post or defensive
shareholder activist does not own enough shares to win boardroom
control or dictate corporate policy,154 "but potentially can use their stake
as a departure point in garnering support for the changes they
advocate."155 Thus, these funds have pushed for reforms that may be
applied to a broad swath of companies, like splitting the role of chairman
of the board and chief executive officer, or pressing for an end to
classified boards.156 In pursuing these goals, these funds have relied upon
academic research demonstrating that such governance reforms improve
share-price performance and, more consistently, Tobin's Q, a measure of
firm value.157 Such strategies may be pursued, and have been pursued, at

148

Kahan & Rock, supra note 141, at 1043.
Id. at 1069.
150
See id. at 1042 (noting that traditional institutions, such as public-pension funds and
mutual funds, have historically made resolutions relating to issues of corporate governance
rules).
151
See, e.g., id. at 1043 ("To the extent that the 'activism' takes the form of merely
voting in favor of proposals by others (or against proposals made by the company's board), it
represents a rather passive form of 'activism.'").
152
See Kahan & Rock, supra note 141, at 1044.
153
See id. at 1070 ("[M]utual funds [and other traditional institutions] view and market
themselves as vehicles for diversification, which enables their investors to gain broad exposure
to markets at low costs.").
154
See Armour & Cheffins, Rise and Fall, supra note 31, at 56.
155
Id.
156
See Kahan & Rock, supra note 141, at 1070; see also Shareholder Rights Project,
HARVARD LAW SCHOOL, http://srp.law.harvard.edu/ (last visited Dec. 27, 2013).
157
See Paul Gompers, Joy Ishii & Andrew Metrick, Corporate Governance and Equity
Prices, 118 Q. J. ECON. 107, 107 (2003) (finding that strong shareholder rights result in higher
149
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many companies via precatory shareholder resolutions at relatively low
cost because they require little or no specific firm knowledge prior to
implementation.158 They have also been pursued via shareholder
litigation, at least at the federal level.159
It is fair to ask whether transactional litigation fits squarely into
either ex ante/"offensive" or ex post/"defensive" activism.160 In some
respects, it does not. For example, most transactional litigation is
brought in deals that will ultimately close.161 Litigating shareholders
usually hope that the deals will close—in friendly deals that they will
close at a higher price than what the board approved,162 and in hostile
deals that they will close at all, in spite of board opposition.163
firm value, profits, and sales growth, lower capital expenditures, and fewer corporate
acquisitions); see also Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Allen Ferrell, What Matters in
Corporate Governance?, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 783, 785 (2008) (finding increases in the
entrenchment index are monotonically associated with economically significant reductions in
firm valuation during the 1990 to 2003 period); Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Charles
C.Y. Wang, Learning and the Disappearing Association Between Governance and Returns,
108 J. FIN. ECON. 323, 346-47 (2013) (providing evidence that the disappearance of the
correlation between stock returns and governance indices in the 2002 to 2008 period was due
to market participants' gradually learning to appreciate the difference between strong and poor
governance firms, and that the indices' negative association with Tobin's Q and operating
performance nevertheless persisted). Contra John E. Core, Wayne R. Guay & Tjomme O.
Rusticus, Does Weak Governance Cause Weak Stock Returns? An Examination of Firm
Operating Performance and Investors' Expectations, 61 J. FIN. 655, 657, 659 (2006) (finding
that evidence does not support a causal relationship between poor governance and weak stock
returns).
158
See James F. Cotter, Anil Shivdasani & Marc Zenner, Do Independent Directors
Enhance Target Shareholder Wealth During Tender Offers?, 43 J. FIN. ECON. 195, 197 (1997)
(concluding that independent outside directors enhance target shareholder gains from tender
offers). See generally Kenneth Lehn, Sukesh Patro & Mengxin Zhao, Governance Indexes
and Valuation: Which Causes Which?, 13 J. CORP. FIN. 907, 908 (2007) (finding evidence that
firms with low valuation multiples were more likely to adopt provisions comprising the
governance indices, not that the adoption of these provisions depresses valuation multiples).
159
See Shareholder Activism, EUR. CORP. GOVERNANCE INST., (Feb. 19, 2013),
http://www.ecgi.org/activism/index.php (discussing shareholder activists' reliance on academic
research, connecting corporate governance with shareholder performance).
160
See Armour & Cheffins, Rise and Fall, supra note 31, at 2-3 (contrasting
"defensive" activism, the agitation for change by an investor with a pre-existing sizeable stake
in a company looking to protect that stake, with "offensive" activism, the practice of
increasing one's stake in a company with the expectation that non-profit-maximizing practices
will be changed, and advocating for that change if necessary).
161
See Thompson & Thomas, supra note 4, at 198 (finding that friendly deals subject
to litigation closed over 65% of the time and hostile deals subject to litigation closed about
64% of the time).
162
See id. at 164.
163
See id. (claiming that when prospective acquirers sue, the ultimate goal is for the
deal to go through, rather than any specific outcome for the litigation).
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Consequently, the target will cease to exist as an independent entity, and
the shareholders will either be cashed out, or will find themselves
owning shares of the new, combined entity.164 Thus, in one sense, the
benefits of deal litigation may be short term and temporary, rather than
systemic and permanent.165
But one might also take the view that the benefits of such litigation
are, in fact, systemic and permanent, of the type that might be pursued by
diversified, long term, universal owners with pre-existing stakes in the
target.166 While it is true that the target itself will cease to exist,
diversified shareholders may benefit market-wide from a well-run private
policing regime to the extent that private enforcement makes it more
difficult for target boards to implement defensive measures (like poison
pills or classified boards).167 Also, litigation may make it more difficult
for such boards to manipulate transactional bidding processes to extract
private benefits at the expense of shareholders in friendly-deal situations,
(at least insofar as the private policing regime's costs are outweighed by
these benefits).168 Challenging mechanisms of director entrenchment
might enhance the overall value of a diversified portfolio by making it
more difficult for boards to inhibit value-enhancing acquisitions or
otherwise undermine the market for corporate control.169
In fact, as demonstrated below, these cases are dominated by
public-pension funds and labor-union funds.170 Mutual funds and hedge
funds play a minimal role in transactional class and derivative actions,171
and I find little or no evidence that these funds ever take a stake in a
company for purposes of engaging in such litigation.172 As discussed
more fully below, institutional-investor participation in these cases

164

See id. at 202.
See Thompson & Thomas, supra note 4, at 203.
166
See John H. Matheson & Brent A. Olson, Shareholder Rights and Legislative
Wrongs: Toward Balanced Takeover Legislation, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1425, 1478, 1481
(1990-91).
167
See id. at 1430-38, n.17, 31, 38, 39.
168
See id.
169
See id. at 1504-06 (noting that board entrenchment reduces shareholder value and
value would increase if eliminated). But see Jay B. Kesten, Managerial Entrenchment and
Shareholder Wealth Revisited: Theory and Evidence from a Recessionary Financial Market,
2010 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1609, 1617 (2010) (finding firms that were less entrenched generated
lower returns than firms that were more entrenched, but noting there may be other contributing
factors).
170
See Kahan & Rock, supra note 141, at 1042.
171
See Thompson & Thomas, supra note 4, at 143-44.
172
See id.
165
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coheres best with ex post/"defensive" shareholder activism, in which
shareholders with a pre-existing stake in the target company bring suit.173
I will revisit the shareholder activism discussion below in light of my
data.174
IV. THE SAMPLE
I began with a hand-collected dataset comprising all 454
shareholder-derivative and class action lawsuits filed in the Delaware
Court of Chancery from November 1, 2003 to December 31, 2009.175 I
obtained this data directly from Lexis-Nexis File and Serve, which is
utilized by the Delaware Court of Chancery as its electronic filing
system.176 I began collecting data from November 2003 because that is
when the Court of Chancery first instituted use of this system.177 I
searched all cases from this time period using the Clerk of the Court's
own search field category for "derivative and class actions". I ended my
collection in 2009 because, at the time of collection, this seemed the
most reasonable date by which I could still expect that a substantial
number of filed cases would be completed.
Of these 454 cases, I identified 290 (64%) as class or derivative
actions brought in mergers-or-acquisitions cases.178 Among these deal
cases, 97% were brought as class actions, with the remaining cases
brought as derivative actions.179 Of the 454, 8 cases were brought as both
class and derivative actions.180 Though I include all of these deal cases in
basic statistics, I exclude cases filed on or after September 15, 2008 from
the regressions below. As I explain, the collapse of Lehman Brothers on
that date wrought substantial changes in deal litigation, providing an
interesting portrait of how litigation changes in a time of crisis.181

173

See Matheson & Olson, supra note 166, at 1503-05.
See supra Part IV.A.
175
Every Table throughout this Article is based on this Sample.
176
See, Electronic Filing in the Delaware Judiciary, JUDICIAL BRANCH OF THE STATE
OF DELAWARE, http://courts.delaware.gov/efiling/index.stm (last visited Dec. 27, 2013).
177
See id.
178
See infra Table 1.
179
See infra Table 1.
180
See infra Table 1.
181
See infra p. 48.
174
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Median (mean) case length for pre-Lehman deal cases is 278 (368)
days.182
A. Basic Statistics—Institutional Lead Plaintiff Characteristics
An obvious first conclusion from the data presented here is that
institutional investors have accepted Delaware's invitation to participate
as lead plaintiffs in these suits.183 Table 1 demonstrates that, of the 290
mergers-and-acquisitions cases filed from November 1, 2003 to
December 31, 2009 in the Delaware Court of Chancery, institutional lead
plaintiffs served in approximately 41% (118/290) of them.184 This figure
has remained fairly constant year-over-year, with exceptions being 2006
and 2007, in which institutional participation reached a high of 51% and
a low of 32%, respectively.185
Table 1: Number of Deal Cases by Year and Lead Plaintiff Type
Year
2003186
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
Total

Number of Cases
10
40
59
43
46
35
57
290

Institutional LP no. (%)
4 (40.00)
15 (37.50)
24 (40.68)
22 (51.16)
15 (32.61)
15 (42.86)
23 (40.35)
118 (40.69)

While the overall rate of institutional participation has remained
fairly constant, the type of institutional-investor lead plaintiff has
changed over time.187 In particular, public-pension and labor-union fund

182

See infra p. 48.
See infra Table 1.
184
See infra Table 1.
185
See infra Table 1.
186
Figures for 2003 are for November and December alone.
187
See infra Table 2.
183
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participation has increased dramatically, coinciding with a sharp decline
in participation by private non-mutual funds.188

Table 2: Number of Cases With At Least One Institutional Lead Plaintiff
Type by Year189

2003190

PublicPension
0

2004

0

2

1

12

15

2005

1

4

3

21

29

2006

3

2

1

19

25

2007

8

3

1

7

19

2008

8

5

0

5

18

2009

12

12

1

2

27

Total

32

28

7

70

137

Year

0

Mutual
Fund
0

Private NonMutual
4

Union

Total
4

Increased public-pension fund participation may reflect the
prevalence of portfolio monitoring by plaintiffs’ law firms. Many
institutions interested in obtaining lead plaintiff appointments enter into
portfolio monitoring arrangements with plaintiffs' law firms, often
several firms.191 The law firms directly access the investment portfolios
of the institutions via the funds' accounts with custodial banks.192 In
many instances, the law firms will discover a potential fraud or a
suspiciously unattractive deal, and notify institutions with significant

188

See infra Table 2.
Note that multiple institutional types may appear as lead plaintiffs in the same case.
Thus, if a public-pension fund appears in the same case as a labor-union fund, they would
count once towards each column. This explains why the total here is greater than the 118
cases with at least one institutional lead plaintiff.
190
Figures for 2003 are for November and December alone.
191
See William B. Rubenstein, What We Now Know About How Lead Plaintiffs Select
Lead Counsel (and Hence Who Gets Attorneys Fees!) In Securities Cases, 3 CLASS ACTION
ATT'Y FEE DIG. 219, 219-20 (2009) ("[S]ome plaintiffs firms have entered into arrangements
whereby they monitor the funds' investments for irregularities and suggest possible grounds for
litigation. . . . MissPERS has monitoring agreements with a dozen firms . . . .").
192
See id. at 219.
189
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exposure that they may qualify for lead plaintiff status.193 Once notified
of the fraud or suspicious transaction, institutions typically issue a
request for proposals to the firms monitoring their portfolios.194 The
proposals state the law firms' assessments of the strengths and
weaknesses of the case, argue whether the fund should or should not
pursue it, and, of course, if the fund does pursue it, why it should select
that firm as lead counsel.195 Thus, the mere fact that plaintiffs' lawyers
monitor public-pension fund portfolios may lead the funds to bring
federal securities fraud class actions or transactional class actions.
Some critics of securities fraud class actions and the relationships
between plaintiffs' lawyers and public-pension funds, such as the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce, have argued that the funds' participation in such
suits is the product of "pay-to-play".196 They argue that plaintiffs'
lawyers contribute to politicians who serve on pension-fund boards in
exchange for those politicians selecting the lawyers as lead plaintiffs in
securities class actions.197 A similar logic would apply to transactional
class actions. I have argued in a separate empirical article that I believe
pay-to-play allegations are overstated, and that other factors appear to be
driving the funds' litigation activism.198 Some researchers have argued
that pay-to-play may affect attorneys' fees, rather than the decision to
bring suit in the first place.199

193
See, e.g., id. at 220 ("Coughlin Stoia would provide free monitoring services of the
Funds' investments and would suggest that the Fund bring securities class actions if it found
any irregularities. In return, if the Fund did choose to bring suit, Coughlin Stoia would be
retained to represent the Fund on a contingent fee basis.").
194
See id. at 219-20 ("MissPERS claims it is able to play each [monitoring firm] off
against the other in terms of determining the fee arrangement.").
195
See Rubenstein, supra note 191, at 219 (describing plaintiffs firms' actions in
monitoring arrangements); see also Plumbers & Pipefitters Local 572 Pension Fund v. Cisco
Sys., Inc., 2004 WL 5326262, at *4 (N.D. Cal. May 27, 2004) (indicating that nothing about
the monitoring arrangements between firms and Funds prevents the Funds from serving as
class representatives in a lawsuit).
196
See Press Release, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, U.S. Chamber Says Overturning
Stoneridge Case Will Harm Investors, Job Creation & Economic Recovery (Aug. 4, 2009),
http://www.uschamber.com/press/releases/2009/august/us-chamber-says-overturningstoneridge-case-will-harm-investors-job-creat (insisting that the system of securities class
action litigation is rife with abuse, including "pay-to-play" arrangements).
197
See id.
198
See Webber, Pay-to-Play, supra note 18, at 2033.
199
See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi, Drew T. Johnson-Skinner & A.C. Pritchard, The Price of
Pay to Play in Securities Class Actions, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 650, 651 (2011)
(observing that while state pension funds as lead plaintiffs generally achieve lower attorneys'
fees, state pension funds with managers who received large campaign contributions from lead
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It is also possible that the relatively high percentage of publicpension-fund lead plaintiffs in 2008 and 2009 reflect increased litigation
activism by the funds in response to losses incurred during the recession
that began in 2007.200 These funds may have decided to become more
aggressive on the litigation front in an effort to make up for their losses
and to help close the gap between the funds' assets and their liabilities.201
It is true that litigation by all institutional types increased sharply after
the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, perhaps reflecting
similar concerns across all institutions, though it should be noted that the
uptick in public-pension-fund participation precedes the full onset of the
crisis.202
Still, because of the purported financial guarantees provided to
them by taxpayers, sporadic instances of corruption, and the more
confrontational approach they have taken with corporate management,
both in courtrooms and at shareholder meetings, public-pension funds
have been subjected to unusually harsh assessments of their investment
performance.203 Public pressure may have prompted them to be proactive
in making up for losses caused by the financial crisis, including through
increased litigation activism.204 Additional data from the coming years
will enable us to determine if this uptick in their mergers-andacquisitions litigation activism was a temporary product of the crisis or
something else.
In addition, these funds' successful record as lead plaintiffs in
these suits may encourage them to bring more of them. As demonstrated
below in Tables 12 and 14, public-pension funds are the only institutions
that statistically significantly correlate with the outcomes of utmost
interest to shareholders—an increase from the offer price to the final

attorney firms did not); see also Webber, Pay-to-Play, supra note 18, at 2081 (providing
evidence against the theory that pay-to-play drives pension-fund participation in securities
litigation).
200
See Webber, Pay-to-Play, supra note 18, at 2036 (noting public-pension fund board
members have incentives to both recover fund losses and advance the fund's bottom line).
201
See id.
202
See supra Table 2.
203
See, e.g., Tom Petruno, Public Pension Funds Forced on Defensive, L.A. TIMES,
Dec. 5, 2004, at C1 (quoting David Hirschmann, then senior vice president of the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce, calling CalPERS' activist approach "a labor agenda in corporate
governance clothing," highlighting the irony of calls to terminate a fund active in corporate
governance because of its own mismanagement, and drawing attention to CalPERS' below
trend performance during the dot-com bust).
204
See id.
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price, and lower attorneys' fees.205 This record may make shareholders
more inclined to apply for the lead plaintiff role, and may make judges
more inclined to select them for the role. Similarly, the increase in
public-pension-fund participation in Delaware mergers-and-acquisitions
litigation may be the slightly delayed by-product of their increased
participation in federal securities fraud class actions.206 The successful
participation by these funds in securities fraud class actions may have
motivated them to expand their litigation activity into the transactional
space as well. The reverse may also be the case, although it appears that
the increase in public-pension-fund activity in securities fraud litigation
preceded that in deal litigation.207
Labor-union funds comprise 16.5% of lead plaintiff appointments
in federal securities fraud class actions—a higher percentage than that
obtained by public-pension funds208—but they are somewhat less active
than their public counterparts in Delaware deal litigation, as shown in
Table 2.209 There are a number of possible explanations for this. One
might attribute their less frequent participation than public-pension funds
to their smaller size, but, of course, this disadvantage at the lead plaintiff
selection stage is just as true in federal securities fraud class actions as it
is in Delaware.210 And as noted above, unlike federal law, Delaware law
lacks a rebuttable presumption that the individual or entity with the
largest stake in the case be the lead plaintiff.211 Delaware considers the
relative economic stakes of the lead plaintiff applicants.212 Ironically,

205

See infra Tables 12, 14.
See Webber, Pay-to-Play, supra note 18, at 2039 (noting that public-pension funds,
whose participation in securities class actions just after the passage of the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act was nonexistent, have since assumed a dominant role in such litigation).
207
Compare supra Table 2, with Webber, Pay-to-Play, supra note 18, at 2039
("Institutional investor participation as lead plaintiffs, and, in particular, public pension fund
participation, rose modestly from zero percent pre-PSLRA to over ten percent between 1996
and 2000. . . . But more recently, public pension funds . . . have begun to step forward in
significant numbers to lead securities class actions. In both 2006 and 2007, these funds served
as lead plaintiff in 40% of securities class actions.").
208
See Stephen J. Choi, Motions for Lead Plaintiff in Securities Class Actions 1, 42
(N.Y.U. L. & ECON. RES. PAPER SERIES, Paper No. 08-53, 2008) [hereinafter Choi, Motions],
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1293926 (reporting that labor-union funds were selected
as a lead plaintiff in 16.5% of the cases in the sample while public-pension funds were lead
plaintiff in 13.4%).
209
See supra Table 2.
210
See Webber, Plight, supra note 18, at 171.
211
See id. (noting the difference between federal law and Delaware law for selection of
lead plaintiffs); cf. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I) (2006).
212
See Coyne v. Catalyst Health Solutions, 2012 WL 2052731, at *1 (Del. Ch. May 25,
206
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because of this more flexible approach, Delaware law should be more
favorable to the selection of labor-union lead plaintiff applicants than is
federal law, at least for applicants competing against larger public
pension funds. Nevertheless, public-pension funds' larger absolute stakes
may give them an advantage at the lead plaintiff selection stage under
other Hirt factors, such as the quality of the lead counsel, as superior
counsel may prefer to work with larger public-pension funds who can
serve as repeat players, or the willingness and ability of the lead plaintiff
applicant to litigate vigorously, which may advantage funds with more
resources.213
Still, even if we assume that these larger stakes do confer
advantages upon public-pension applicants, Delaware judges often avoid
selecting lead plaintiffs themselves, instead requesting that the lead
plaintiff applicants reach their own agreements about the structure of the
lead plaintiff group.214 It is therefore possible that labor-union funds
could often obtain co-lead plaintiff appointments with larger publicpension funds, if they insisted upon it. Instead, relatively low laborunion-fund participation in these suits may reflect their decision to free
ride off of public-pension fund efforts.
Of course, this would also be true for federal securities class
actions. The difference may lie in the fact that there are far fewer
Delaware transactional cases than federal securities class actions.215 It
may be that labor-union funds are inclined to bring the same cases as
public-pension funds at the transactional level, but that they are
interested in bringing different cases at the federal level. Or they are
interested in bringing more cases than public-pension funds do, and there
are still numerous federal securities cases "left over" for them to lead,

2012) (citing Hirt v. U.S. Timberlands Serv. Co., 2002 WL 1558342, at *2 (Del. Ch. July 3,
2002)) (according "great weight" to the relative economic stakes of the candidates for lead
plaintiff in the outcome of the suit).
213
See Hirt, 2002 WL 1558342, at *2 (noting factors for lead plaintiff selection such as
the quality of lead counsel or the willingness and ability of the lead plaintiff).
214
See, e.g., TCW Tech. Ltd. v. Intermedia Commc'ns, Inc., 2000 WL 1654504, at *3
(Del. Ch. Oct. 17, 2000) (dictum) ("In every single instance that I am able to recall, this Court
has resisted being drawn into [lead plaintiff appointment] disputes.").
215
My data show there were 224 transactional and derivative class action filings in
Delaware between November 2003 and the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy on September 15,
2008, while there were 904 federal securities class action filings over the same
time period.
See CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, Securities Class Action Filings—2013
Mid-Year
Assessment,
3
fig.
2,
at
3
(2013), available
at
http://securities.stanford.edu/clearinghouse_research/2013_YIR/Cornerstone-ResearchSecurities-Class-Action-Filings-2013-MYA.pdf.
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whereas there are fewer Delaware transactional cases. It may also be
that labor-union funds may sometimes bring cases outside of Delaware,
though public-pension funds may do the same.216 Finally, labor-union
incentives in these cases may be more complex than those of publicpension funds. For example, union members may be employed by either
target or bidder companies, thereby complicating the unions' views of the
proposed transaction.217 This might make them less inclined—or more
inclined—to bring a lawsuit, depending on the circumstances of the
individual case.
Mutual funds play little role in Delaware transactional litigation.218
They served as lead plaintiffs in just seven cases in the sample.219 This is
consistent with the low rate of mutual fund participation in federal
securities class actions, and shareholder activism generally.220 This
clearly reflects a conscious decision by mutual funds to avoid
participating as lead plaintiffs in these suits. Mutual funds manage even
more assets than public-pension funds do, and own substantial stakes in
the transactions that are the subject of the suits studied in this Article.221
They are sophisticated and credible,222 and Delaware judges would likely
be eager to appoint them if they applied. But they don't.223
The reasons they do not apply are likely similar to the reasons they
rarely participate in securities fraud class actions or in shareholder
activism more broadly.224 The strongest reason is the free rider

216
See, e.g., John Armour, Bernard Black & Brian Cheffins, Is Delaware Losing Its
Cases?, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 605, 611 [hereinafter Armour, Black & Cheffins,
Losing] (reporting a growing trend of lawsuits over mergers-and-acquisitions transactions
being brought in jurisdictions outside of Delaware); Cain & Davidoff, supra note 104
(examining the dynamics of state competition for merger litigation cases).
217
See, e.g., Webber, Plight, supra note 18, at 160 (noting the conflicting incentives of
union members employed by both target and bidder companies).
218
See supra Table 2.
219
See supra Table 2.
220
See discussion supra Part III.B.
221
Compare INV. CO. INST., 2012 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK 9 (52d ed.
2012), available at http://www.icifactbook.org/2012_factbook.pdf (reporting that there were
over $11.6 trillion invested in mutual funds in 2011), with U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2012, 753 tbl.1217 (2012), available at
http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2012/tables/12s1219.pdf (recording that there were
$2.928 trillion invested by state and local public-pension funds in 2010).
222
See Kahan & Rock, supra note 141, at 1048 (recognizing the benefits of mutual
funds).
223
See infra notes 224-32 and accompanying text.
224
See discussion supra Part III.B.
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problem.225 One question at the heart of shareholder litigation—and of
shareholder activism more generally—is why anyone, institution or
individual, would seek a lead plaintiff appointment when all they are
entitled to collect is their pro rata share of the settlement or verdict?226
Optimally, one should prefer that someone else bear the costs of serving
as a lead plaintiff. For mutual funds that compete with one another, and
that may face withdrawals annually or even quarterly based on fund
performance, serving as a lead plaintiff means incurring costs while
conferring free benefits on your competitors, who, as class members,
also obtain their pro rata share of settlements or verdicts.227 Thus, it is
often economically irrational for mutual funds to serve as lead plaintiffs,
or to engage in shareholder activism more broadly.228 In contrast, publicpension funds and labor-union funds have no true competitors.229
Individuals employed by a state or local government entity, or in certain
capacities by a private company, have their retirement savings
automatically invested in the public-pension fund or labor-union fund
associated with their employer.230 If a fund beneficiary is unhappy with
the fund's performance, the beneficiary's only option is to change jobs,
not move one's retirement savings to a competitor.231 Thus, while publicpension funds and labor-union funds still face the free rider problem

225

See Rock, supra note 82, at 461-62 (discussing the free rider problem and its

benefits).
226

See Kahan & Rock, supra note 141, at 1052-54 (concluding that mutual funds
should only engage in activism when a fund has a disproportionate stake in the portfolio
company such that the fund's relative gain over its competition outweighs the costs of the
activism).
227
See id.
228
See id. at 1053-54 (showing the extent to which any benefit derived from mutual
funds' activism would be diluted by benefit to the competition); see also, e.g., Rock, supra
note 82, at 473-74 (citations omitted) ("To the extent that money managers are evaluated in
comparison to other managers and to market indices, such money managers will have no
selective incentives to engage in actions that improve the performance of widely diversified
funds across the board. A change that benefits all will benefit none.").
229
See Kahan & Rock, supra note 141, at 1065-66 (noting that hedge funds need not
worry about competitor funds).
230
See, e.g., id. at 1059 (listing among the differences between public-pension funds
and hedge funds the fact that public-pension funds do not have to compete in the market for
capital).
231
See, e.g., MASS. PUB. EMP. RET. GUIDE, 2 (2012), available at
http://www.mass.gov/perac/guide/retirementguide.pdf (explaining that contributing to a staterun retirement system is mandatory for "nearly all" full-time public employees).
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when serving as lead plaintiffs, or engaging in any activism, they incur
fewer costs from such free riding than do mutual funds.232
There are additional reasons why mutual funds often avoid
shareholder activism and litigation. First, a substantial component of the
mutual fund business consists of investing the 401(k) retirement savings
of public company employees.233 These funds will not want to jeopardize
this business by suing their customers, the corporate boards, and
corporate managers that select which mutual fund options to offer their
employees.234 Second, mutual funds may avoid litigation for "social
network" reasons.235 Unlike the firefighters, police officers, and teachers
who sit on the boards of trustees of public-pension funds, mutual fund
managers are more likely to travel in the same business, social, and
educational circles as do corporate managers and directors.236 Such
social-network effects may reduce their participation in aggressive
activism "within the circle."237 Because mutual funds diversify their
investments, the kind of activism that would be logical for them to
pursue bears a closer resemblance to that undertaken by public-pension
funds, which is based in part on a strategy of pursuing change at a broad
swath of companies, and thereby potentially alienating many people

232

See Kahan & Rock, supra note 141, at 1065-66.
See
Frequently
Asked
Questions
About
401(k)
Plans,
ICI.ORG,
http://www.ici.org/policy/retirement/plan/401k/faqs_401k (last visited Oct. 11, 2013) (stating
that 60% of 401(k) assets were held in mutual funds as of September 30, 2012).
234
See Kahan & Rock, supra note 141, at 1055-56 (demonstrating that mutual funds'
desire to retain corporate pension accounts contributes substantially to their reluctance to
engage in shareholder activism); cf. Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89
MICH. L. REV. 520, 602 (1990) (observing that Armstrong World Industries transferred its
employee savings plan business to Fidelity after Fidelity stopped opposing a Pennsylvania
antitakeover law that Armstrong supported).
235
See Kahan & Rock, supra note 141, at 1054 ("Managers of such funds may be
reluctant to antagonize present or future clients of their parent company with their governance
activity.").
236
See id. 1054-55 (explaining that the afflictions that mutual fund management
companies have with other financial institutions could make those managers hesitant with
governance activism); Roberta Romano, Public Pension Fund Activism in Corporate
Governance Reconsidered, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 795, 822 (1993) ("The composition of public
fund boards may also explain why public funds are more active in corporate governance than
private funds even if private fund managers lack conflicts of interest involving other business
relations with issuers.").
237
Cf. Romano, supra note 236, at 822 (arguing that private funds would be less likely
to engage in activism than public-pension funds because the private-fund managers do not
receive the same professional benefits by challenging company management).
233
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within the social network.238 In addition, as relayed to me by a director of
corporate governance and associate general counsel at a top mutual fund,
such funds avoid leading activist campaigns because their financial
analysts prize, and guard, their access to senior corporate managers.239
Such analysts prefer that their employers avoid actions that might
alienate corporate managers who might then refuse to respond to their
inquiries.240 This is not to say that mutual funds engage in no activism.241
But they usually allow public-pension funds and labor-union funds to
take the lead, to become the public face of activist initiatives, following
the lead of these funds by occasionally voting in favor of their activist
initiatives.242 Finally, different mutual fund managers within the same
mutual fund family may hold different stakes in the target and bidder
companies, and may have adverse interests in the outcome of the suit.243
Engaging in litigation or activism may raise conflicts within the mutual
fund family.244 Thus, free-riding competitors, business conflicts, socialnetwork conflicts, and conflicts within mutual fund families all deter
mutual funds from obtaining lead plaintiff appointments.245

238

See id. at 818 (citing CalPERS's criticism of Sears, General Motors, ITT, and others
through its shareholder rights program as an example of a public pension fund's effort to
influence several companies).
239
See Gregg Wolper, Shareholder Activism, Mutual Fund Style, MORNINGSTAR (May
28, 2013), http://ibd.morningstar.com/article/article.asp?id=598082&CN=brf295,http://ibd.mo
rningstar.com/archive/archive.asp?inputs=days=14;frmtId=12,%20brf295 (stating
that
a
potential downside to activism is a likelihood of decreased meetings with the companies and
analysts).
240
Id.
241
See Kahan & Rock, supra note 141, at 1069.
242
See id. at 1043 (reporting that most mutual funds do not seek governance change by
spearheading shareholder proposals). There is one form of activism with which mutual funds
are associated: behind-the-scenes activism. Id. at 1044. For example, mutual funds have
engaged companies outside the public eye to push for confidential voting, board diversity, and
limitations on targeted stock placements. Id. Because such activism takes place behind the
scenes, it is difficult to quantify. Still, it is reasonable to infer that such activism is both
infrequent and ineffective, in part because shareholders who are unwilling to go public with
their activist demands lack leverage over corporate managers. Without such leverage, it is
difficult to discern why managers would accede to activist demands. See id. at 1044-45
(discussing regulatory obstacles to the effective coordination by shareholders of such behindthe-scenes efforts).
243
See Webber, Plight, supra note 18, at 206.
244
See id. (finding that those within the mutual fund family may have competing
interests in the target company).
245
See supra Part IV.A.
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I place the remaining institutional investors into a catchall
category called "private non-mutual funds."246 This category includes a
small number of hedge funds and other private-entity-investor lead
plaintiffs.247 It also includes a large number of private entities whose
business functions or purposes are not readily apparent.248 Overall,
private non-mutual funds comprise the largest group of institutional lead
plaintiffs in the sample, serving in the role in 72 of 290 cases.249 These
funds are discussed in greater detail below in Part V.B.ii.250 For purposes
of this section, I note that the participation of these funds as lead
plaintiffs counters those of public-pension and labor-union funds. Their
participation has dropped as participation of the latter has risen.251 Such
funds served as lead plaintiffs in 21 cases in 2005, dropping to just 2
cases in 2009.252
One possible explanation for the decline of private non-mutualfund lead plaintiffs is that other, larger players are crowding them out.253
Public-pension funds and labor-union funds may simply have more at
stake in these cases than do private non-mutual funds, and win lead
plaintiff appointments accordingly. Relatedly, Delaware's development
of clearer standards for its lead plaintiff selection process, favoring larger
players, may have driven smaller institutional investors or law firms
without institutional clients to bring cases in jurisdictions outside of
Delaware, taking these institutions with them.254 Armour, Black, and
Cheffins provide evidence that Delaware has been losing cases to other
jurisdictions, and that part of this trend may be related to Delaware's

246

See supra Table 2.
See supra Table 1. Hedge funds participated as lead plaintiffs in only eight cases in
the sample.
248
Cf. SEC, MUTUAL FUNDS: A GUIDE FOR INVESTORS, 5 (2007), available at
http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/sec-guide-to-mutual-funds.pdf (recognizing that investment
types such as "hedge funds" and "funds of hedge funds" are not mutual funds).
249
See supra Table 1.
250
See infra Part V.B.ii.
251
See supra Table 2.
252
See supra Table 2.
253
See TCW Tech. Ltd. P'ship v. Intermedia Commc'ns, Inc., 2000 WL 1654504, at *4
(Del. Ch. Oct. 1, 2000) (holding that when deciding which plaintiff to pick for the lead
plaintiff position, one factor to consider is how much each plaintiff shareholder has at stake in
the outcome of the lawsuit).
254
See Armour, Black & Cheffins, Losing, supra note 216, at 650-51 (finding support
for the hypothesis that Delaware's use of a multi-factor analysis to appoint a lead plaintiff
rather than a first-to-file basis is causing smaller firms to bring suit in other fora).
247
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adoption of lead plaintiff selection criteria.255 As a general observation,
this trend suggests that some of the results in this Article may be
understated, particularly those in the latter half showing correlations
between institutional lead plaintiff types and case outcomes.256
Individuals, smaller institutions, and their lawyers, attempting to litigate
weaker cases, may find themselves unable to compete for lead plaintiff
and lead counsel appointments in Delaware.257 Therefore, they take their
lawsuits elsewhere.258 If these weaker cases, led by plaintiffs with less
ability to monitor counsel, were included in the sample, the contrast
between, for example, public-pension-fund lead plaintiffs and traditional
lead plaintiffs might be even greater than presented here.
Before concluding this section, it is worth revisiting the
shareholder-activism literature outlined above in light of these data on
institutional-investor participation.259 As noted, it is debatable whether
mergers-and-acquisitions litigation fits squarely within the types of
activities that would normally be thought of as shareholder activism, in
part because if the litigation succeeds, the target of the activism will
disappear.260 The usual objective of such suits is a quick bump in price, a
classic short-term strategy.261 Yet, in other ways, these data show that
deal litigation may fit into the strategic/incidental pattern of activism
identified by Kahan and Rock, or offensive or defensive activism in
Armour and Cheffins' terminology.262 Though one could surmise that
hedge funds would take a position in the target—perhaps even after the
deal is announced, as an arbitrage—and then file suit, their infrequent

255
Id. at 646 ("When plaintiffs' lawyers cannot resolve for themselves who should be
lead counsel, judges outside Delaware often appoint as lead or co-lead counsel the firm that
filed first. Consequently, since TCW Technology, filing first has probably been more valuable
to plaintiff lawyers outside than inside Delaware. This could create incentives for some
lawyers—especially smaller firms, without established track records in Delaware—to race to
file outside Delaware." (citations omitted)).
256
See discussion infra Part IV.A (discussing why public-pension funds are likely the
institutions chosen for lead plaintiff roles).
257
See Cain & Davidoff, supra note 104 (concluding that Delaware favors awarding
higher attorney’s fees in strong cases over attracting many weak cases, thereby diluting its
law).
258
See Armour, Black & Cheffins, Losing, supra note 216, at 645.
259
See supra Part III.B.
260
See discussion supra notes 160-65 and accompanying text.
261
See Krishnan et al., supra note 1, at 1248, 1253 (explaining that in mergers-andacquisitions litigation, the harm sought to be remedied is usually "too low a price").
262
Armour & Cheffins, Rise and Fall, supra note 31, at 2-3; Kahan & Rock, supra
note 141, at 1069.
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participation in these actions reveals that this is not a strategy they
pursue.263 In contrast, the frequent institutional lead plaintiffs are classic
incidental or defensive activists, bringing litigation over pre-existing
ownership stakes.264 Such activism coheres with the economic analysis
provided by Kahan and Rock to explain why certain institutions engage
in one type of activism or the other.265 Though not costless, transactional
class actions are relatively inexpensive for institutional investors to
pursue, largely because the litigation costs are borne by the plaintiffs' law
firms.266 Moreover, hedge funds may avoid these suits because the
expensive "learning" that is required to make most activism profitable
may not be worth the investment here.267 The returns from such litigation
may be too expensive and too infrequent to be worth the cost, and the
learning that would be required is really legal learning more akin to the
expertise of a plaintiffs' law firm than the expertise of sophisticated
hedge fund asset managers. It may also be the case that the hedge funds
simply prefer to free ride off of public-pension funds and other
institutional investors, rather than incurring their own litigation costs.
Also, hedge funds are notoriously secretive about their trading strategies,
and may not wish to reveal them in a deposition, as might be required of
them when serving in the lead plaintiff capacity.268
Thus, while not a perfect fit, the shareholder-activism literature
suggests that obtaining a lead plaintiff role in a transactional class action
is more akin to incidental or defensive shareholder activism, and is more
consistent with the profit models of diversified investors like publicpension and labor-union funds than that of hedge funds.

263
See supra Table 2 (showing a diminishing presence of "Private Non-Mutual" funds,
which includes hedge funds, in transactional litigation).
264
See Kahan & Rock, supra note 141, at 1069.
265
See id. at 1069-70.
266
See Macey & Miller, supra note 98, at 52; cf. Kahan & Rock, supra note 141, at
1070 (arguing that the narrowly-tailored strategy of activism is suitable for hedge funds).
267
See Kahan & Rock, supra note 141, at 1070 (stating that strategic activist mutual
funds must learn from more experienced activists in an expensive learning phase).
268
See, e.g., Hedge Fund Trading Styles Overview, MACROPTION,
http://www.macroption.com/hedge-fund-trading-styles-overview/ (last visited Oct. 26, 2013)
("Hedge fund managers often keep their trading strategies secret to preserve their competitive
advantage and the strategy's profitability.").
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B. Basic Statistics—Deal Characteristics
The discussion of deal characteristics in this Section is designed to
paint a portrait of the overall landscape of mergers-and-acquisitions class
and derivative actions. An appreciation of this landscape is conducive to
understanding why certain types of institutional investors concentrate
their efforts in one part of it or another.
First, most of the litigation is targeted at friendly deals; 191/290
(65%) were brought in such deals, whereas just 13/290 (4%) were
brought in hostile deals.269 This is not surprising, since most deals are
friendly deals.270 Of the litigated deals, 69/290 (23%) involved a
controlling shareholder acquirer.271 These deals find themselves in the
crosshairs of public-pension funds, as discussed more fully below in Part
V.272 Of the litigated deals, 50/290 (17%) of litigated deals contained two
bidders or more;273 these deals are targeted by the top plaintiff law
firms,274 as discussed more fully below in Part V.275
Table 3: Deal Characteristics276
Deal Characteristics

Number of Cases

Controlling Shareholder

69

LBO

42

Friendly

191

Hostile

13

Second Bidder

39

More Than 2 Bidders

11

269

See infra Table 3.
See infra Table 3.
271
See infra Table 3.
272
See discussion infra Part V.
273
See infra Table 3.
274
See infra Table 7.
275
See discussion infra Part V (discussing the types of deals top plaintiff law firms
270

target).
276

The figures in this Table add up to more than the total number of deal cases because
there is some overlap between the deal characteristics described. Likewise, the percentages in
the paragraphs discussing this Table could add up to more than 100%.
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In terms of deal structure, 209/290 (72%) were cash-for-stock
deals.277 It would not be surprising if this is higher than the overall
percentage of deals that are cash for stock, at least in part because under
Revlon, Delaware law is favorable to target plaintiff shareholders in cash
out deals.278 In contrast, 49/290 (16%) cases were brought in stock-forstock deals.279
Table 4: Deal Structure
Structural Features

Number of Cases

Cash-for-Stock

209

Stock for Stock

49

Hybrid-Stock

17

Hybrid-Cash

10

Hybrid-Half

1

Table 5 presents the most frequently litigated deal terms.280 The
deal term that was most likely the subject of litigation was the
termination fee (117 cases).281 The termination fee is an agreed-upon fee
that the target company will pay the bidder if the deal is not completed.282
The primary purpose of the termination fee is to protect the initial bidder
who, after conducting costly due diligence and making a public bid, may
be upstaged by free-riding competitive bidders who then bid a penny
more.283 Without a termination fee, no bidder will want to bid first.284 A

277

See infra Table 4.
See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 176 (Del.
1986) ("[W]hen addressing a takeover threat, [the] principal is limited by the requirement that
there be some rationally related benefit accruing to the stockholders."); supra note 3 and
accompanying text.
279
See infra Table 4.
280
See infra Table 5.
281
See infra Table 5.
282
See Thomas A. Swett, Merger Terminations After Bell Atlantic: Applying a
Liquidated Damages Analysis to Termination Fee Provisions, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 341, 355
(1999).
283
See id. at 356 (listing protecting information and opportunity costs of first bidder as
a purpose of the termination fee).
284
See Ely R. Levy, Note, Corporate Courtship Gone Sour: Applying a Bankruptcy
278

2014]

PRIVATE POLICING OF MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS

43

typical termination fee should be between 3–5% of the offer.285
Termination fees are frequently targeted by shareholder lawsuits286: they
amount to a penalty for shareholders exercising their lawful right to
decline a bid, and may be coercive, particularly for deals where the
offered premium is not much more than the termination fee.287 Yet,
termination fees did not correlate with any particular lead plaintiff type.288
This is probably because they are frequently litigated as a matter of
course by all types of lead plaintiffs.289
In a typical deal process, the target board performs a market check,
hopefully negotiating with multiple bidders before settling upon one, and
then consenting to a No-Shop provision that limits the board from
shopping the company to other potential bidders.290 No-Talk provisions
similarly limit the target board from speaking with other potential
bidders.291 No-Shops and No-Talks were litigated in 25 and 7 cases,
Approach to Termination Fee Provisions in Merger and Acquisition Agreements, 30 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 1361, 1371 (2002) (suggesting that, although this position is contested, termination
fees can benefit the target because they may induce the initial bid).
285
See Brian JM Quinn, Optionality in Merger Agreements, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 789,
808 n.87 (2010) ("[C]ourts have approved fees in the range of 3% of transaction value and as
large as 6% of transaction value.").
286
See, e.g., In re IXC Commc'ns, Inc. v. Cincinnati Bell, Inc., 1999 WL 1009174 at
*28-*29 (Del. Ch. Oct. 27, 1999) (addressing the plaintiff's claim that the termination fee
contributed to the board of director's breach of fiduciary duty); cf. John C. Coates, IV, M&A
Break Fees: US Litigation vs. U.K. Regulation, 24, 27 (Harvard Law Sch., Harvard Public
Law Working Paper No. 09-57, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1475354
(suggesting that termination fees do not generate suits because litigation is significantly more
frequent in deals without termination fees, but also positing that there is an interaction between
termination fees and bid competition which may complicate the causal relationship of
termination fees to litigation).
287
See Brazen v. Bell Atl. Corp., 695 A.2d 43, 50 (Del. 1997) (indicating the
possibility that a termination fee could be coercive, given the presence of structurally or
situationally coercive factors). But cf. Phelps Dodge Corp. v. McAllister, 1999 WL 1054255,
at *2 (Del. Ch. Sept. 27, 1999) ("Consequently, I do not take up plaintiffs' challenge to the
termination fee as being unduly coercive, although I think 6.3 percent certainly seems to
stretch the definition of range of reasonableness and probably stretches the definition beyond
its breaking point. . . . I need not reach this issue . . . .").
288
See supra text accompanying note 175. This determination is based on the Author's
compilation of research from 2003 to 2009, comprising of 454 shareholder derivative and class
action lawsuits in the Delaware Court of Chancery.
289
See infra Table 5.
290
See Guhan Subramanian, Go-Shops vs. No-Shops in Private Equity Deals:
Evidence and Implications, 63 BUS. LAW. 729, 736 (2008) [hereinafter Subramanian, GoShops]; Karl F. Balz, No-Shop Clauses, 28 DEL. J. CORP. L. 513, 514 (2003) (further
explaining No-Shop provisions); cf. Go-Shops, supra, at 756-60 (discussing the characteristics
of Go-Shop provisions that support the fulfillment of the Revlon requirement).
291
See Balz, supra note 290, at 514 (explaining the No-Talk provision).
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respectively.292 On the other hand, Go-Shop provisions reverse the
typical bidding process.293 A board enters into an agreement with a single
bidder at the outset, and then, with a deal in hand, turns to the market
with the bidder's consent to seek a better offer.294 Go-Shop provisions
have recently emerged as a deal technology and have stirred controversy,
with advocates arguing that they are shareholder-friendly and detractors
suggesting that they are mere window dressing for done deals, enabling
them to withstand Revlon scrutiny without a true bidding process.295
Recent empirical research offers evidence that Go-Shops result in higher
premiums for shareholders, except in management buyouts, suggesting
that it is usually appropriate for Go-Shops to be viewed as satisfying a
board's Revlon duties.296 Go-Shops were litigated in 13 cases.297 As will
be discussed below in Part V.A, Go-Shop provisions negatively correlate
with institutional lead plaintiffs.298
Table 5: Deal Terms
Deal Terms

Number of Case

Termination Fee

117

No Shop

25

No Talk

7

Go Shop

13

I also examined the target's listing exchange. The vast majority of
target companies were listed on either NASDAQ or NYSE, with slightly
more companies listed on NASDAQ (133) than NYSE (115).299 It is

292

See infra Table 5.
See Subramanian, Go-Shops, supra note 290, at 735.
294
See id. at 730 (describing the Go-Shop process).
295
See id. at 739-40 (comparing the view that a Go-Shop provision can only improve a
seller's position because it allows subsequent higher bids to be considered with the view that
no real post-deal shopping happens, but the provision allows the buyer to curtail pre-deal
shopping).
296
See id. at 751-52, 760 (finding that pure Go-Shop deals achieve approximately 5%
higher abnormal returns for target shareholders than No-Shop deals).
297
See infra Table 5.
298
See infra Part V.A.; supra Table 1.
299
See infra Table 6.
293
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tempting to state that this follows a well-known pattern of litigation more
frequently targeting technology companies, who dominate NASDAQ and
tend towards greater share-price volatility.300 This argument has been
used to explain why such companies are more likely to be targeted by a
securities fraud class action.301 More volatile companies are more likely
to incur the sharp drop in price that is associated with a shareholder
suit.302 Similarly, volatility might explain the suits here, to the extent that
deal litigation and deal price are affected by the 52-week high.303
Table 6: Target Listing
Exchanges

Number of Target Companies
Listed

NYSE

115

NASDAQ

133

Other

32

Finally, I examined plaintiff-law-firm participation. Below, Table
7 identifies the most frequent law-firm participants.304 Some of these
firms are significant players in securities fraud class actions, and some
are not.305 The legal issues and the economics of transactional and

300

See Ken Little, What Market Indexes Tell Us[:]
The Dow and
Other
Market
Indexes
Explained,
ABOUT.COM,
http://stocks.about.com/od/understandingstocks/a/Indexes102704.htm (last visited Sept. 14,
2013) ("Nasdaq is heavily weighted to technology stocks."); Education: Aggressive Growth
Investing, ZACKS INV. RESEARCH, http://www.zacks.com/education/articles.php?id=58 (last
visited Sept. 14, 2013) (explaining that many technology companies on the NASDAQ have
high beta ratings which denote volatility).
301
D&O and Securities Litigation:
Recent Trends in Federal Securities
Litigation,
GORDON
&
REES
LLP
(Feb.
2007)
http://www.gordonrees.com/publications/viewPublication.cfm?contentID=343 (indicating that
a strong market and low stock volatility reduces the number of lawsuits filed).
302
See Baruch Lev, How to Win Investors Over, 89 HARVARD BUS. REVIEW 54, 54-55
(Nov. 2011) (arguing that lowering volatility reduces the likelihood of a shareholder lawsuit).
303
See Malcolm Baker, Xin Pan & Jeffrey Wurgler, The Effect of Reference Point
Prices on Mergers and Acquisitions, 106 J. FIN. ECON. 49, 50-51 (Oct. 2012) (finding that
offer prices are biased towards the 52-week high).
304
See infra Table 7.
305
See Choi, Motions, supra note 208, at app.D (listing frequent lead counsel in
securities class actions).
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securities class actions differ substantially from one another, as discussed
earlier in Part III.A,306 which might lead one to think that different
universes of law firms would litigate the two types of cases. On the
other hand, two key factors enable the same plaintiff law firms to operate
in both fields of litigation: (1) both involve representation of a class of
shareholders for a contingency fee;307 and (2) both lend themselves to
portfolio monitoring relationships with institutional-investor clients
because such clients are favored class representatives in both types of
cases.308 As for the first point, these firms already operate on a business
model that requires them to finance litigation for extended periods of
time on their own, rather than through the collection of monthly billings
from clients who pay by the hour.309 Unlike traditional law firms, these
firms need not create a new business model to move from one field of
litigation to another.310 And as for the second point, firms that engage in
portfolio monitoring have ready access to the clients and the information
that they need to realistically pursue lead counsel appointments in either
transactional or securities fraud class actions.311 Still, it is noteworthy
that many of the firms that do participate in both forms of litigation
designate different attorneys and sometimes different practice groups to
focus on each litigation specialty.312
I offer additional analysis of law firms and case characteristics in
Part V.A. below.313

306

See discussion supra Part III.A.
See 4B MICHAEL J. CHEPIGA & PAUL C. CURNIN, COMMERCIAL LITIGATION IN
NEW YORK STATE COURTS § 80:10 (3d ed. updated 2012).
308
See Rubenstein, supra note 191, at 219 (discussing how the monitoring of
investments by plaintiffs firms leads to the retention of that firm as lead plaintiff in most
cases).
309
See Paula Batt Wilson, Attorney Investment in Class Action Litigation: The Agent
Orange Example, 45 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 291, 311-13 (1994) (describing the complex
financing contracts entered into by the class action plaintiffs' attorneys).
310
See id. at 291.
311
See discussion supra Part III.A (noting that law firms who engage in portfolio
monitoring have access to information such as client investments).
312
E.g., Our People, CHIMICLES & TIKELLIS, LLP, http://www.chimicles.com/ourpeople (last visited Sept. 14, 2013) (illustrating that some firms may designate attorneys to
work exclusively on transactional class actions, rather than securities fraud class actions).
313
See discussion supra Part V.A.
307
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Table 7: Most Frequent Plaintiff Law Firm Participant314
Plaintiff Law Firm

Number of
Appearances

Rosenthal, Monhait & Goddess, P.A.*
Chimicles & Tikellis, LLP**
Rigordsky & Long, P.A.*
Milberg, Weiss, Bershad, Hynes & Lerach,
LLP
The Brualdi Law Firm, P.C.
Wolf Popper LLP
Faruqi & Faruqi, LLP**
The Weiser Law Firm, P.C.
Schiffrin & Barroway, LLP
Prickett, Jones & Elliott, P.A.*
Bernstein Liebhard & Lifshitz, LLP
Wolf Haldenstein Adler Freeman & Herz, LLP
Goodkind Labaton Ruddoff & Sucharow,
LLP**
Lerach Coughlin Stoia Geller Rudman &
Robbins, LLP
Bull & Lifshitz, LLP
Glancy Binkow & Goldberg, LLP
Gardy & Notis, LLP
Wechsler, Harwood Halebian & Feffer, LLP
*Headquartered in Delaware. **Office in Delaware.

314

129
60
52
31
29
24
23
21
20
19
18
17
15
14
12
11
10
10

An earlier version of this table, based on the data collected for this Article, was
published by Brian Cheffins, John Armour, and Bernard Black. Brian Cheffins, John Armour
& Bernard Black, Delaware Corporate Litigation and the Fragmentation of the Plaintiffs'
Bar, 2 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 427, 473-74 (2012) (illustrating an earlier version of Table 7).
The reason for the slight discrepancy between the data presented in this table and the data
published in the aforementioned article is that this table includes appearances by firms in
earlier incarnations under slightly different names.

48

DELAWARE JOURNAL OF CORPORATE LAW

[Vol. 38

V. THE CASE CHARACTERISTICS ASSOCIATED WITH INSTITUTIONAL
LEAD PLAINTIFFS
In this Section, I examine what case characteristics are associated
with institutional lead plaintiffs, and with particular types of institutional
lead plaintiffs, focusing on public-pension funds, labor-union funds, and
private non-mutual funds. This discussion will not involve mutual funds
and hedge funds, which rarely participate in these suits.315
But before doing so, I offer a brief explanation of why I exclude
cases following the bankruptcy filing of Lehman Brothers on September
15, 2008.316 This event is typically viewed as the trigger of the profound
financial crisis of 2008.317 It wreaked tremendous economic havoc which
manifested itself in mergers-and-acquisitions litigation as it did almost
everywhere else.318 A comprehensive assessment of how this event
affected mergers-and-acquisitions litigation is beyond the scope of this
Article. However, I note that in unpublished statistical tests, I find
substantial differences before and after the bankruptcy filing of Lehman
Brothers in key case characteristics, such as the size of the premium in
litigated deals. Deal premiums over which investors might have been
ecstatic pre-Lehman became subject to suit post-Lehman.319 Moreover,
as discussed in Part IV above, all institutions began litigating more deals
post-Lehman.320 Because the focus of this Article is an assessment of
transactional litigation in "normal times," and not in the midst of a
financial panic, I set aside post-Lehman Brothers cases in assessing the
data on case characteristics and case outcomes associated with
institutional-investor lead plaintiffs.

315
See Kahan & Rock, supra note 141, at 1042-43 (explaining that hedge funds and
mutual funds represent a passive form of activism).
316
See In re Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., No. 1:08-BK-13555 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
filed Sept. 15, 2008).
317
See, e.g., JOSEPH TIBMAN, THE MURDER OF LEHMAN BROTHERS: AN INSIDER'S
LOOK AT THE GLOBAL MELTDOWN 7 (2009); MARK T. WILLIAMS, UNCONTROLLED RISK:
THE LESSONS OF LEHMAN BROTHERS AND HOW SYSTEMIC RISK CAN STILL BRING DOWN
THE WORLD FINANCIAL SYSTEM 1 (2010).
318
See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERSLLP, supra note 55, at 5 (describing the increase
in mergers-and-acquisitions litigation as a percentage of transactions after 2008).
319
Id.
320
See supra text accompanying note 202; Table 2.
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A. Institutional-Investor Lead Plaintiffs in the Aggregate
In my first cut at the data, I examine institutional investors in the
aggregate.321 What cases are they attracted to? What cases do they
avoid?
Table 8: Determinants of an Institutional Lead Plaintiff
Model One
0.05813

Complaint
Length

Model Two

Model Three

0.443691

0.421172

(0.000)***
0.720147

(0.001)***
0.729398

(0.034)**
-1.60346

(0.036)**
-1.40027

(0.034)**
-1.34263

(0.033)**
0.121455

(0.066)*
0.19444

(0.075)*
0.20778

(0.175)
0.730229

(0.036)**
0.924989

(0.028)**
0.921716

(0.094)*

(0.045)**

(0.046)**
0.348724

0.000

0.000

(0.001)***
Complaints

Premium
20%

< 0.71658

Go-Shop

Target
MCAP
Cash/Stock

Control SHH

P-Value

(0.387)
0.000

Binary logistic regressions with dummy-dependent variable for
institutional lead plaintiff. This data is Pre-Lehman. *** = 1%
confidence, ** = 5% confidence, * = 10% confidence.

321

See infra Table 8.
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First, complaint length correlates with institutional lead
plaintiffs.322 To place this variable in context, I note that the baseline
complaints in these cases are often short.323 I would describe some of
them as "control-find-replace" complaints, in which the only details
altered by the law firm from case-to-case are the names of the
plaintiffs.324 These complaints contain broad allegations of misconduct
and generic pleas to increase disclosure, open up the bidding process,
and raise the offer price.325 In contrast, institutional lead plaintiffs
correlate with longer complaints that reflect a substantial review of the
case details, identifying specific problems with the transaction and
enumerating its legal flaws.326 The complaint length reflects this deeper
investigation of the case made by the institutions and the law firms that
they select to represent them.327 Complaint length may also reflect a
competitive environment for lead plaintiff selection. Delaware courts
consider the quality of the complaint in lead plaintiff selection.328
Complaint length may roughly proxy for complaint quality; institutions
in a competitive situation (and their lawyers) likely write longer
complaints when competing for the lead plaintiff role.

322

See supra Table 8.
Mean complaint length is 19 pages, maximum is 68 pages, and a minimum is 6
pages. See supra Table 8.
324
In some cases, the plaintiff's gender may not even be identified correctly. See
discussion infra pp. 58-59 (discussing "cut and paste" complaints).
325
See, e.g., Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 364 (Del.
2006) (affirming Delaware Court of Chancery decision to dismiss shareholder derivative
action with non-institutional plaintiff for failure to plead with sufficient specificity).
326
See, e.g., In re Citigroup Inc. Derivative S'holder Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 114-15 (Del.
Ch. 2009) (institutional lead plaintiff's complaint was eighty-six pages long); TCW Tech.
P'ship v. Intermedia Commc'ns, Inc., 2000 WL 1654504, at *4 (Del. Ch. Oct. 17, 2000)
(appointing institutional plaintiffs lead plaintiffs because their pleadings covered the claims
being made by smaller shareholders and because of the enthusiasm with which they have
litigated).
327
Interestingly, as noted below in Table 13, the most frequent law firm participants in
these cases (excluding local counsel) correlate with shorter complaints, except when they serve
institutional-investor lead plaintiffs, in which case they correlate with longer complaints. See
infra Table 13. This suggests either that institutional investors demand more work from these
firms, that firms work harder when litigating cases associated with institutions, or that the
institutions use firms other than the most frequent players.
328
See, e.g., Hirt v. U.S. Timberlands Serv. Co., 2002 WL 1558342, at *2 (Del. Ch.
July 3, 2002) (recognizing that the "quality of the pleading" is an important factor to consider
when deciding who to designate as lead plaintiff).
323

2014]

PRIVATE POLICING OF MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS

51

Not surprisingly, the number of complaints correlates with
institutional lead plaintiffs.329 It may be that the number of complaints
proxies for case quality, with more complaints correlating with poor deal
terms and unhappy investors bringing suit independently of one
another.330 The correlation between the number of complaints and
institutional investor lead plaintiffs may also be an example of herding
behavior, with one institution's involvement attracting the attention of
others.331 In particularly large, high-profile cases, institutions may
compete to assume the lead role.332 Then again, institutions might also
prefer to free ride off of the lead-plaintiff efforts of other institutions,
which would run counter to the institutional-herding explanation.333
Another version of the herding explanation is that the number of
complaints may also reflect interest by plaintiff law firms representing
small clients. These law firms may file suit where they observe or
anticipate that institutional investors will also file suit. The firms hope
that the institutions' counsel, upon winning the lead counsel role, will
offer them some work on the case in exchange for a small percentage of
the legal fee. Like jackals hovering around the lion's kill, these firms
know that the cost of chasing them away may be greater than the cost of
letting them eat scraps. For example, one cost that the small firms can
impose on the larger players is to object to the settlement at the court
hearing.334 Even lions prefer well-fed jackals to hungry ones.
The offer premium is the percentage difference between the offer
price and the target's pre-offer trading price.335 One might expect that

329

See supra Table 8.
See Jessica Erickson, Corporate Governance in the Courtroom: An Empirical
Analysis, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1749, 1768 (2010) ("[I]nstitutional investors in derivative
suits are drawn to the bigger, higher-quality cases.").
331
John C. Coffee, Jr., Liquidity Versus Control: The Institutional Investor As
Corporate Monitor, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1277, 1310 (1991) ("Institutional investors often share
the same views and thus trade in a herd-like manner.").
332
Note that the market capitalization of the target is significant in Models Two and
Three, suggesting that institutions bring suit in larger cases. See supra Table 8.
333
See Coffee, supra note 331, at 1285-86 n.23 (discussing the "free rider" problem).
334
See Edward Brunet, Class Action Objectors: Extortionist Free Riders or Fairness
Guarantors, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 403, 436-38 (2003) (discussing objection "blackmail"
where an objector's attorney seeks only to maximize his fee); Bruce D. Greenberg, Keeping
the Flies out of the Ointment: Restricting Objectors to Class Action Settlements, 84 ST.
JOHN'S L. REV. 949, 961-64 (2010) (discussing tactics objector counsels use in order to
increase their fees, especially in larger litigations).
335
See, e.g., Dale A. Oesterle, Target Managers as Negotiating Agents for Target
Shareholders in Tender Offers: A Reply to the Passivity Thesis, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 53, 60330
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offer premium alone would negatively correlate with institutional
investor lead plaintiff appointments. One view of mergers-andacquisitions litigation is that low-deal premiums motivate shareholder
suits; shareholders ultimately care about price, and might remain quite
content with coercive deal terms if they are well-compensated for it.336
Therefore, one would expect that the size of the premium would
negatively correlate with institutional lead plaintiffs. Yet, premium
alone was not significant in any regression model.337
In Table 8, I further subdivide the premium data using a dummy
variable for deals whose initial offers constitute a less-than-20%
premium.338 The 20% threshold is frequently used in practice as a "rule
of thumb" for whether a deal's terms are fair for shareholders; deals with
20%+ premiums may be difficult to challenge, whereas deals below the
threshold are more vulnerable.339 Here, the results are significant at the
5% confidence level.340 Deals with a less-than-20% offer premium
positively correlate with institutional lead plaintiffs, as expected.341 Half
of all cases with less-than-20% offer premiums are led by institutions
(56/113).342 In contrast, institutions lead just 32% of more-than-20%
offer-premium deals (36/111).343
Go-Shop provisions negatively, and statistically significantly,
correlate with institutional lead plaintiffs, at the 5% confidence level in
Model One, and at 10% confidence in Models Two and Three.344 GoShop provisions encourage the target board to shop the company to other
potential higher bidders, usually within some specified time frame.345
The presence of such a provision may persuade potential institutional
lead plaintiffs not to bring suit. It may indicate that the target board has
complied with Revlon by taking the appropriate steps to obtain the

61 (1985-86) (discussing the functioning of an offer premium).
336
See Webber, Plight, supra note 18, at 204 (a central component of mergers-andacquisitions complaints is that the offer price is too low).
337
See supra Table 8.
338
See supra Table 8.
339
Aaron Yoran (Jurkevitz), Advance Defensive Tactics Against Takeover Bids, 21
AM. J. COMP. L. 531, 531 n.1 (1973) ("[In the United States,] a 20% premium [is] a common
rule of thumb.").
340
See supra Table 8.
341
See supra Table 8.
342
See supra Table 8.
343
See supra Table 8.
344
See supra Table 8.
345
See Subramanian, Go-Shops, supra note 290, at 730 (defining Go-Shop provisions).
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highest price for shareholders.346 Alternatively, a Go-Shop provision may
simply be an indicator of an attractive deal for shareholders.347 Its
presence may be a measure of the target and the bidder's confidence in
the quality of the deal. It may not be doing any work itself to fend off a
potential lawsuit, but may simply indicate that a deal is attractive enough
that it is highly likely that no lawsuit is forthcoming, at least not one
from a sophisticated institutional lead plaintiff. A less sanguine view of
the negative correlation between the presence of Go-Shops and
institutional lead plaintiffs is not that Go-Shops reflect the attractiveness
of the deal, but that they deter other bidders from trying to outbid the
target board's current choice of acquirer, or pay the accompanying
termination fee.348 Institutions may avoid suit where they fear a
diminished probability of a second bidder, and consequently, a lower
likelihood of share-price appreciation. Still, prior research suggests that
this cynical view of Go-Shops is misplaced, at least outside of the MBO
context.349
In Models Two and Three, the market capitalization of the target
positively correlates with institutional lead plaintiffs.350 This supports the
contention that institutional investors target larger deals.351 They may do
so both because they have more at stake in these deals and because they
prefer to litigate high-profile transactions that may attract favorable
attention for institutions serving as shareholder advocates. Still, it should
be noted that target-market capitalization alone does not predict
institutional-investor lead plaintiffs, and is not even statistically
significant in all models.352
Cash-for-stock deals also positively correlate with institutional
lead plaintiffs.353 Most deals are cash-for-stock deals.354 But the fact that

346
See id. at 731 ("[G]o-[S]hop provisions, appropriately structured, can satisfy a target
board's Revlon duties.").
347
See Phillip Mills & Mutya Harsch, How to Avoid the Jump, 25 INT'L FIN. L. REV.
44, 45 (2006) (discussing the attractive features of a Go-Shop provision).
348
See Subramanian, Go-Shops, supra note 290, at 736 ("[T]he combination of the fee
and the first bidder's match right may deter a prospective bidder.").
349
See id. ("[Outside the MBO context,] [o]n average, go shops yield more aggregate
search, significant post-signing competition, and slightly higher returns to target shareholders
than traditional no-shop deals.").
350
See supra Table 8.
351
See Erickson, supra note 330, at 1768 ("[I]nstitutional investors in derivative suits
are drawn to the bigger, higher-quality cases.").
352
See supra Table 8.
353
See supra Table 8.
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cash-for-stock deals are particularly targeted by institutional investors
requires explanation. One possible cause is Revlon.355 Revlon creates a
favorable legal regime for plaintiff shareholders, because in cash-out
mergers directors face enhanced scrutiny and a duty to maximize the
share price.356 In contrast, the legal regime in stock-for-stock deals is
more complex.357 Delaware courts have taken the view that shareholders
in stock-for-stock transactions are more insulated from abuse than
shareholders in cash-out mergers, in part because they maintain an
ongoing stake in the enterprise.358 Plaintiff shareholders may therefore be
more inclined to bring litigation under a Revlon regime, both because
they are more susceptible to exploitation in cash-for-stock deals, and
because the law makes it more likely that they can obtain a favorable
outcome from the litigation.359 Yet, it is also worth noting that Thomas
and Thompson find no improvement in outcomes in Revlon cases versus
other cases.360 Institutions may merely be acting on the perception that
they will do better in Revlon cases.
Finally, I note that in Model Three, controlling-shareholder
transactions do not significantly correlate with institutional lead
plaintiffs.361 I highlight this result because it is a principal distinction
between cases brought by institutions overall and cases brought by the
most active and successful institutional lead plaintiffs—public-pension
funds. Public-pension funds target controlling-shareholder deals in their
lawsuits.362 Minority shareholders are at their most vulnerable in such
transactions.363 I discuss this point further in the next Section.364
354
See Elliott J. Weiss, Balancing Interests in Cash-Out Mergers: The Promise of
Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 8 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 2 n.4 (1983) (noting that cash-out mergers are
the most common type of mergers).
355
Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 184 (Del.
1986).
356
Id. at 182, 184 (holding that directors who sell in cash-out mergers have a duty to
get the best price for stockholders rather than to protect the corporate assets).
357
See generally Arnold v. Soc'y of Sav. Bancorp, Inc., 650 A.2d 1270 (Del. 1994)
(illustrating the complexities of the legal regime in stock-for-stock deals).
358
See id. at 1289-90.
359
See Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182, 184 (holding that the director's role is to get the best
price for the stockholders at a sale of the company, making plaintiffs less susceptible to
exploitation and increasing the likelihood of a favorable outcome from litigation).
360
See Thompson & Thomas, supra note 4, at 195-96 (noting Revlon's slight effect on
shareholder litigation outcomes).
361
See supra Table 8 (noting that of the cases with institutional lead plaintiffs only
.348724 are controlling-shareholder transactions).
362
See infra Table 9.
363
Victor Brudney & Marvin A. Chirelstein, A Restatement of Corporate Freezeouts,
87 YALE L.J. 1354, 1357 (1978) (stating that controlling-shareholder transactions are coercive
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B. Case Selection Variables by Institutional Type
1. Public-Pension Funds and the Targeting of Controlling-Shareholder
Transactions
The most notable difference between transactions targeted by
institutional lead plaintiffs generally and those targeted by publicpension funds is that the latter are much more likely to target controllingshareholder transactions.365 As noted in Table 10 below, the presence of
a controlling shareholder is a statistically significant predictor of a
public-pension lead plaintiff.366 The likelihood of a public-pension lead
plaintiff increases dramatically in the presence of a controlling
shareholder.367 There are a number of reasons why this might be the case.

of minority stockholders because the majority can require the minority to accept terms through
majority rule).
364
See infra Part V.B.i. (examining why minority shareholders are most vulnerable to
exploitation by an acquirer in a controlling shareholder transaction).
365
See supra Table 8 (noting that in Model Three, institutional lead plaintiff cases with
controlling shareholders was .348724); infra Table 9 (noting that in Model Three, publicpension lead plaintiffs with controlling shareholders was 1.48324).
366
See infra Table 10.
367
See infra Table 9.
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Table 9: Indicators of Public-Pension Lead Plaintiff
Model One
0.069676
(0.001)***
1.31811
(0.168)
Target Market 0.748832
Cap
(0.000)***
Controlling
1.52773
Shareholder
(0.015)**
Cash-for-Stock 0.337657
(0.642)
#
Lead
Plaintiffs
Premium
Complaint
Length
Hostile

Go-Shop

Model Two
0.062668
(0.004)***

0.697917
(0.000)***
1.12596
(0.098)*

Model Three
0.06913
(0.001)***
1.33169
(0.192)
0.759752
(0.000)***
1.48324
(0.021)**
0.441603
(0.554)

0.128425
(0.077)*
-0.28704
(0.869)
-0.757747
(0.522)

Binary logistic regressions with dependent-dummy variable for the
presence of a public-pension fund lead plaintiff, including Pre-Lehman
deal cases only. The premium, complaints, and Go-Shop variables were
dropped from Models One and Two in this regression for lack of
significance. *** = 1% confidence, ** = 5% confidence, * = 10%
confidence.
First, minority shareholders are most vulnerable to exploitation by
the acquirer in a controlling-shareholder transaction.368 In the typical
acquisition, the acquirer is a third party.369 But in a controllingshareholder transaction, the acquirer is an insider.370 Controlling
shareholders play a substantial role in influencing the composition of the
target's board of directors, thereby undermining the board's ability to

368

See Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 363, at 1357.
See, e.g., Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 176,
178 (Del. 1986) (illustrating a normal acquisition where both possible acquirers were third
parties).
370
See, e.g., Kahn v. Lynch Commc'n Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1113, 1115 (Del.
1994) (illustrating a controlling-shareholder transaction where the acquirer is an insider).
369
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independently assess price and deal terms.371 Controlling shareholders
also have access to inside information.372 Such access can give a
controlling shareholder the ability to favorably time its acquisition to
squeeze out the minority shareholders, depriving them of the full benefit
of their investments.373 For example, a controlling shareholder in a
pharmaceutical company might attempt an acquisition prior to
publication of clinical studies demonstrating the likely success of a drug
in the company's research and development pipeline. For these reasons,
Delaware courts have instituted additional legal protections for minority
shareholders in controlling-shareholder transactions.374
This combination of the strong potential for exploitation of
minority investors,375 and the attendant legal protections designed to
thwart such exploitation,376 may attract public-pension lead plaintiffs.
Such plaintiffs may be more inclined to participate in cases where they
are particularly vulnerable to exploitation; they may be further attracted
to such cases when the legal protections in place increase the likelihood
that their leadership of a lawsuit will result in tangible benefits. It may
also be the case that any investor would happily lead such cases, but that
public-pension funds are well-positioned to seize the leadership role
because they are the largest institutional players (at least among
institutions willing to participate in such litigation), have the most at
stake, and therefore are favored for the lead plaintiff role under the Hirt
factors outlined above.377 Below, I will revisit this question of whether
public-pension funds are the best litigators, or whether they just cherrypick the best cases.378

371
Guhan Subramanian, Fixing Freezeouts, 115 YALE L.J. 2, 9-10 (2005) (discussing
lack of independent assessment by target's board where acquirer controls selection of target's
board).
372
Id. at 32 (noting that controlling shareholders have access to inside information and
could take advantage of nonpublic information).
373
Id. (stating that inside information gives controlling acquirers the ability to freeze
out the minority at a more favorable time).
374
See supra Part III.B (discussing additional protections for minority shareholders in
controlling-shareholder transactions).
375
See supra note 363 and accompanying text.
376
See supra Part III.B.
377
See Hirt v. U.S. Timberlands Serv. Co., 2002 WL 1558342, at *2 (Del. Ch. June 9,
2002); see also supra text accompanying notes 53-54 (outlining the Hirt factors).
378
See infra Part VI.A.
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As with institutions generally, target-market capitalization is a
significant predictor of a public-pension lead plaintiff.379 But this factor
correlates much more strongly with public-pension lead plaintiffs than it
does with institutions generally.380 The coefficients for the target-market
capitalization variable are more than three times larger for publicpension funds than for institutions generally.381 Moreover, the results
increase in statistical significance from 5% confidence for institutions
generally to 1% confidence for public-pension funds.382 In further
analyzing the correlation between market capitalization and publicpension lead plaintiffs, I subdivided the targets by market capitalization
into quartiles, from 0–25th, 25th–50th, 50th–75th, and 75th–100th
percentiles.383 The simple regression below in Table 9A illustrates the
probability of suit by a public-pension-fund lead plaintiff by target
market capitalization:
Table 9A: Public-Pension Lead Plaintiffs By Target-Market
Capitalization
Target Market Capitalization By
Quartile
Target
MCAP
25th–50th
Percentile
Target
MCAP
50th–75th
Percentile
Target
MCAP
75th–100th
Percentile

Model One
-0.9097
(0.942)
1.6335
(0.058)*
2.8368
(0.000)***

Thus, public-pension funds obtain lead plaintiff appointments in
large-deal cases in which they also have a high stake.384 It is clear that

379
See supra Table 9 (showing a correlation between public-pension lead plaintiffs and
target market capitalization).
380
Compare supra Table 8 (showing data for institutions generally), with supra Table
9 (showing data for public-pension lead plaintiffs).
381
Compare supra Table 8 (coefficient range of 0.12 to 0.2 for institutions), with supra
Table 9 (coefficient range of 0.7 to 0.75 for public-pensions).
382
Compare supra Table 8 (institutions), with supra Table 9 (public-pensions).
383
See infra Table 9A (showing data for public-pension lead plaintiffs by target-market
capitalization).
384
See supra Table 9A.
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public-pension funds save their litigation ammunition for the largest
targets, though size alone is not the only factor.385
Like institutions generally, the length of the complaint also
increases the probability of involvement by a public-pension lead
plaintiff.386 Public-pension funds write complaints that are nearly twice
as long as the overall sample; the median (mean) complaint length for
public-pension funds is 29 (29) pages, compared to a median (mean) of
15.5 (17.9) pages for cases overall. The length of the complaint is
utilized here as a proxy for attorney and lead plaintiff effort.387 As noted
earlier, complaint length is probative of lead plaintiff and lead counsel
effort.388 Shorter, "cookie cutter" complaints with "cut and paste" lead
plaintiffs and claims tend to be written by law firms representing
individual lead plaintiffs who stand little chance of obtaining an
appointment.389 Such lead plaintiffs, and more likely, their counsel, have
probably filed suit in the hope that no one else will, or that the
ultimately-appointed lead plaintiff will give the attorneys who filed the
short complaint some work on the case and a small share of the fee.390
Winning lead counsel may choose to do so in the hope that these
attorneys will not direct their individual clients to object to the
settlement.391 In contrast, longer complaints tend to be written by lead
counsel representing institutional investors who have a realistic chance
of winning the appointment.392 As noted above, Delaware courts
consider the quality of the complaint in making this selection.393

385

See supra Table 9A.
Compare supra Table 8 (illustrating how the length of the complaint correlates with
an institutional lead plaintiff), with supra Table 9 (illustrating how the length of the complaint
correlates with involvement of a public-pension lead plaintiff).
387
See supra notes 326-28 and accompanying text (describing possible reasons why
complaint length is correlated with involvement by institutional lead plaintiffs and higher
quality complaints).
388
See supra notes 326-27 and accompanying text.
389
See supra notes 324-25 and accompanying text.
390
Choi et al., Do Institutions Matter?, supra note 117, at 873; Charles Silver & Sam
Dinkin, Incentivizing Institutional Investors to Serve as Lead Plaintiffs in Securities Fraud
Class Actions, 57 DEPAUL L. REV. 471, 478 (2008).
391
See Silver & Dinkin, supra note 390, at 478.
392
See supra notes 326-27 and accompanying text.
393
See TCW Tech. P'ship v. Intermedia Commc'ns, Inc., 2000 WL 1654504 at *4 (Del.
Ch. Oct. 17, 2000) (stating that the plaintiff that has the greatest economic stake in the
outcome should be chosen to represent the class); supra note 328 and accompanying text.
386
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Unlike institutional investors generally, the offer premium plays
little or no role in public-pension-fund case selection.394 This result is
particularly intriguing given that the involvement of public-pension
funds alone correlate with an increase in offer price, as discussed
below.395 Moreover, public-pension lead plaintiffs do not correlate with
cash-for-stock deals.396
I conclude this Section with some final observations about publicpension lead plaintiffs. First, unlike institutional investors generally,
participation of public-pension funds does not correlate with the number
of complaints.397 I find some weak evidence that they correlate with the
number of lead plaintiffs, as evidenced in Table 9 above.398 I note that
this result is not particularly robust. There are a few possible
explanations for why public-pension funds might correlate with the
number of lead plaintiffs, rather than with the number of complaints.
First, public-pension funds may be more likely to file for the lead
plaintiff role in pre-arranged groups of two or more, rather than
individually.399 Stephen Choi finds some evidence for this kind of
coalition building by public-pension funds in securities fraud class
actions.400 In competitive lead plaintiff situations, institutions eager to
assume the lead plaintiff role, and the law firms that represent them, are
incentivized to form such groups.401 They may aggregate their stakes in
the target to increase their probability of being selected as lead
plaintiffs.402 Such voluntary aggregation into lead plaintiff groups prior
to filing a complaint or moving for lead plaintiff appointment may
explain why the number of lead plaintiffs correlates with public-pension
participation and why the number of complaints does not. Such

394

Compare supra Table 8 ("Premium < 20%"), with infra Table 12 ("Premium").
See infra Table 12.
396
See supra Table 9.
397
Compare supra Table 8, with supra Table 9.
398
See supra Table 9.
399
See Choi, Motions, supra note 208, at 211-12.
400
See id. (suggesting that the presence of multiple lead counsel in an initial lead
plaintiff motion in 21.2% of the sample indicates the formation of a plaintiff group before the
lead plaintiff appointment).
401
See id.; see also Silver & Dinkin, supra note 390, at 477-78 (discussing the
incentives for investors to occupy the lead plaintiff position and why public-pension funds in
particular are more eager to assume the lead plaintiff role).
402
See Choi, Motions, supra note 208, at 211-12; Cox et al., supra note 118, at 366
("There is a continuing practice of permitting groups of individuals to aggregate their claims,
particularly when they share a pre-existing relationship.").
395
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aggregation may be facilitated by portfolio monitoring, discussed
earlier.403 Law firms that engage in portfolio monitoring may be able to
identify multiple public-pension clients and offer to aggregate their
stakes for purposes of applying for the lead plaintiff role.404 Another,
related, explanation might be that public-pension funds, and their
attorneys, may prefer not to litigate the lead plaintiff issue, instead opting
for a "big tent" strategy comprised of larger lead plaintiff groups.405 But
if this were the case, one might still expect to see more complaints,
followed by aggregation. Finally, smaller players may be less inclined to
file complaints in cases in which public-pension funds have, thinking
that they have little hope of obtaining any lead plaintiff or lead counsel
role against such competition.406 Perhaps public-pension funds are less
susceptible to threats from smaller players objecting to settlement, given
their frequent participation in such suits, their experienced counsel, and
their comparative success in the lead plaintiff role, as discussed more
fully below.407
It is commonly known that public-pension funds actively engage
in corporate-governance-reform efforts.408 I hypothesized that corporategovernance issues could constitute a factor in their case selection.
Accordingly, I used the Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell Entrenchment Index
("E-Index") to determine if board-entrenchment measures could attract
(or repel) public-pension lead plaintiffs, but the results were not
significant, nor were they significant for other institutions or for
institutions generally.

403

See supra note 311 and accompanying text.
See Webber, Plight, supra note 18, at 167.
405
See Webber, Pay-to-Play, supra note 18, at 2051-52 (stating that large publicpension funds with losses large enough to qualify them for a lead plaintiff appointment
frequently forgo the opportunity to be appointed lead plaintiff).
406
See Webber, Plight, supra note 18, at 180 (recognizing the possibility that
sophisticated individual investors may like to obtain lead plaintiff appointments, but have no
chance to obtain a leadership role under the current system that favors institutional lead
plaintiffs).
407
See infra notes 429-38 and accompanying text.
408
See Webber, Plight, supra note 18, at 199-200 (discussing the participation of
public-pension funds in corporate-governance reform).
404
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2. Labor-Union Funds, Mutual Funds, and Private Non-Mutual Funds
Table 10: Indicators of Labor-Union Lead Plaintiff
Model One
0.302665
(0.001)***
0.415387
(0.024)**
2.6752
(0.074)*

Model Two
0.297939
(0.002)***
0.407735
(0.028)**
2.66328
(0.09)*
2.86035
(0.038)**
-2.73203
(0.044)**

Model Three
# Complaints
0.292741
(0.002)***
targetMCAP
0.408012
(0.028)**
Cash-for-Stock
2.79401
(0.089)*
Duty of Faith
2.91036
(0.036)**
Duty
of
-2.72851
Loyalty
(0.044)**
Derivative
0.773596
(0.639)
Binary logistic regression with dependent variable dummy for laborunion fund. This data is Pre-Lehman and P-values are indicated in
parentheses. *** = 1% confidence; ** = 5% confidence; * = 10%
confidence.
What is most noteworthy about labor-union-fund lead plaintiffs is
that they strongly correlate with cash-for-stock deals.409 As noted earlier,
institutional lead plaintiffs (except public-pension funds) correlate with
cash-for-stock deals.410 But the correlation between labor-union funds
and cash-for-stock transactions is far stronger than it is for other
institutions.411 Labor unions target these transactions, and may also be
successful at obtaining lead plaintiff appointments in them because the
larger public-pension funds direct more of their attention to controllingshareholder transactions.412 As noted earlier, cash-for-stock deals deprive
investors of future profits of the target.413 The potential for exploitation
of such investors, and the accompanying legal protections offered to such

409

See supra Table 10 (Cash-for-Stock).
See supra Table 8 (Cash/Stock); supra text accompanying note 355.
411
Compare supra Table 10 (2.7-2.8 labor-union fund coefficient), with supra Table 8
(0.73-0.92 institution coefficient).
412
Compare supra Table 9 (Controlling Shareholder), with supra Table 9 (Cash-forStock).
413
See supra notes 353-60 and accompanying text.
410
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investors by Delaware courts under Revlon, may make it attractive to
litigate such deals.414
A couple of points of comparison with public-pension funds are
also worth making here. As noted in Table 8, the involvement of
institutions generally correlates with longer complaints and more
complaints.415 Public-pension funds correlate with the former but not the
latter,416 though they do correspond with more lead plaintiffs, for the
reasons discussed above in Part IV.A.417 Labor-union funds correlate
with more complaints, but not longer ones.418 This suggests that they
apply in competitive cases, but cannot, or do not, succeed in getting their
attorneys to draft longer and more detailed complaints. Finally, like
other institutions, target-market capitalization correlates with labor-union
lead plaintiffs, less strongly than for public-pension funds, and more
strongly than for other institutional types.419 Labor-union funds also
target larger cases in which they have more at stake.420
Because there are so few mutual-fund lead plaintiffs in the sample,
there is little to be said about their non-participation in these suits.421 As
discussed above, mutual funds face several conflicts in serving as lead
plaintiffs that other institutional types do not face.422 These conflicts
render them passive participants in these cases.423

414

See supra note 359 and accompanying text.
See discussion supra Part V.A.; supra Table 8.
416
See supra Table 9.
417
See discussion supra Part IV.A.
418
See supra Table 10.
419
See supra Table 9A (Public-Pension Lead Plaintiffs by Target-Market
Capitalization); Table 10 (Labor-Union Lead Plaintiff by Target-Market Capitalization); infra
Table 11 (Private Non-Mutual-Fund Lead Plaintiffs by Target-Market Capitalization).
420
See supra Table 10.
421
See supra text accompanying notes 218-19, 224.
422
See discussion supra Part IV.A .
423
See supra text accompanying notes 241-42.
415
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Table 11: Indicators of Private Non-Mutual-Fund Lead Plaintiffs
Model One
0.297743
(0.001)***
Target Market Cap
-0.05498
(0.545)
Premium < 20%
0.670328
(0.066)*
Cash-for-Stock
0.52565
(0.273)
Go-Shop
-1.8581
(0.088)*
Binary logistic regression with dependent-dummy variable for private
funds. *** = 1% confidence, ** = 5% confidence, * = 10% confidence.
# Complaints

Finally, private non-mutual funds follow the overall pattern for
institutions, targeting cases in which multiple complaints have been filed,
in which the premium is below 20%, and avoiding Go-Shop
provisions.424 Unlike other institutions, market capitalization of the target
is not significant,425 suggesting that these funds target smaller deals. Nor
do deal characteristics other than premium and Go-Shops seem to
matter.426 Finally, private non-mutual funds do not seem to make the
effort to write longer complaints.427
VI. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LEAD PLAINTIFFS, LEAD COUNSEL,
CASE CHARACTERISTICS, AND CASE OUTCOMES
In this Section, I assess the outcome of greatest interest to
shareholders, the increase in share price from the offer to the final price,
and attorneys' fees.

424

See supra Table 11.
Compare supra Table 9A, and supra Table 10, with supra Table 11.
426
See supra Table 11.
427
See supra Table 11; discussion supra Part V.A.
425
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A. Percentage Change From Offer to Final Price
Table 12: Indicators of Percentage Increase from Offer to Final Price428
Model One

PublicPension
Dummy
Friendly

0.09394
(0.087)*
0.0688
(0.032)**
Cash-for0.10757
Stock
(0.010)**
Target Market 0.009274
Cap
(0.283)
SPDR
500
Change From 0.45957
Offer to Final (0.000)***
Deal Close
0.18888
(0.000)***
Derivative
0.0395
(0.781)
Premium

Model Two
(Completed
Deals Only)

Model Three

0.09047
(0.056)*
0.01793
(0.518)
0.00934
(0.803)
-0.00277
(0.712)

0.09885
(0.055)*
0.06857
(0.029)**
0.09307
(0.016)**
0.010567
(0.197)

0.22142
(0.011)**

0.47529
(0.000)***
0.15844
(0.000)***

0.0338
(0.771)
-0.09257
(0.278)
0.03821
(0.538)
-0.04277
(0.573)

Go-Shop
Hostile

R-squared

29.9%

7.1%

29.8%

OLS regression with dependent variable=percentage change from offer
to final price (pre-Lehman). P-values in parentheses. *** = 1%
confidence; ** = 5% confidence; * = 10% confidence.

428

For transactions with multiple cases that remained unconsolidated, I included only
the first case by filed date in assessing the change from offer to final price, to avoid
overweighting these transactions in my results. I included all cases in basic statistics.
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The results show that public-pension funds correlate with an
increase from the offer to the final price.429 I emphasize here that this
result includes a control for overall market movements—the percentage
change from the offer to the final price of the SPDR 500, an
electronically-traded fund that tracks the S&P 500.430 This result
potentially justifies the policy favoring selection of institutional-investor
lead plaintiffs, at least insofar as this policy leads to the selection of
public-pension funds. One possible interpretation of this result is that
public-pension funds do, in fact, improve representation for shareholders
in these suits, much as the theory supporting their selection predicts.
Public-pension funds are large institutional investors with substantial
stakes in these cases, at least on an absolute basis.431 They therefore have
"skin in the game".432 They have incentives to monitor class counsel and
to make sure that the case is litigated properly because of their
substantial dollar investments in the target (subject to the size of their
investment in the acquirer, if any).433 They are fiduciaries with access to
counsel, including, in some cases, the state attorney general's office or
the city counsel's office.434 They are comparatively sophisticated, repeat
consumers of legal services with established relationships with law firms
and, in many instances, portfolio-monitoring arrangements with these
firms.435 Such portfolio monitoring may allow the funds to play the law
firms against each other in negotiating the best contracts for legal
representation, and securing the highest quality work product.436 Their
motivation and relative sophistication may actually result in improved
prices for the shareholders they represent.437 They may make better
litigation decisions.438 They may prevent the law firms that represent the
class from expending too little effort, settling the case too quickly, or
underinvesting in the litigation. The law firms may also work harder to

429

See supra Table 12.
See MUTUAL FUNDS REGULATION AND COMPLIANCE HANDBOOK § 34:2 (West
2012 ed., database updated through 2013) (defining the SPDR 500).
431
See supra notes 213-14 and accompanying text.
432
See supra notes 213-14 and accompanying text.
433
See supra note 64.
434
See Webber, Plight, supra note 18, at 219.
435
See id.
436
See Perino, supra note 114, at 385-87 (describing reductions in attorneys fees due to
negotiation by public-pension fund lead plaintiffs).
437
Cf. id. at 383-384, 390 (concluding the same in regards to public-pension fund
participation in securities class actions).
438
Cf. id. at 374.
430
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please public-pension fund clients, given their potential to serve as repeat
customers. The funds may also have the political clout or the media
savvy to attract attention to the case, or to exercise other levers of power
that may compel the defendants to increase the offer price. Publicpension fund litigation skill, political clout, and media savvy may induce
the target board to seek a price increase from the acquirer, and may
induce the acquirer to grant it.
Another potential interpretation of this result is that public-pension
funds cherry-pick the best cases, that is, they obtain lead plaintiff
appointments in those cases with the greatest likelihood that the final
price will exceed the offer price.439 This could be because they select the
cases with case attributes that correlate with good outcomes.440 It could
also be that they select cases in which arbitrageurs will drive up the price
above the initial offer price.441 I cannot rule out these possibilities, but
there is evidence that cuts against them.442 First, in terms of cherrypicking the best cases, there is little overlap between the variables that
predict public-pension lead plaintiffs and the variables that predict
increased share price. For example, public-pension funds clearly target
controlling-shareholder transactions, but litigation over such transactions
does not significantly correlate with improved prices,443 whereas
litigation with public-pension lead plaintiffs does.444 Other variables that
one might associate with cherry-picking, such as the market

439

Some research on federal securities fraud class actions suggests that public-pension
funds correlate with better outcomes for shareholders, even accounting for cherry-picking. See
Perino, supra note 114, at 369; see also Cheng et al., supra note 78, at 358; Choi et al., Do
Institutions Matter?, supra note 117, at 892 ("[P]ublic pension[] [funds] tend[] to target both
larger stakes cases and those with stronger evidence of fraud.").
440
See Perino, supra note 114, at 376-77.
441
It is frequently the case that arbitrageurs drive the target price up after an offer is
announced to somewhere above the initial target price but below the offer price, discounted by
the risk that the deal will not close. See, e.g., How Mergers and Acquisitions Affect Stock
Prices, LEARNING MKTS., http://www.learningmarkets.com/how-mergers-and-acquisitionsaffect-stock-prices/ (last visited Feb. 15, 2013). In a small number of cases arbitrageurs may
drive the target price up even above the initial offer price. Id. How frequently this occurs is a
matter of dispute. See, e.g., Jan Jindra & Ralph A. Walkling, Speculation Spreads and the
Market Pricing of Proposed Acquisitions, 10 J. CORP. FIN. 495, 501 n.9 (2004) (finding
negative speculation spreads in 23% of cash tender offers from a sample of 362 deals in excess
of $10 million in 1981-1995 (which predates the entry of institutional investors into deal
litigation)). Note that the Jindra and Walkling article does not address the effect of litigation
on the pricing of proposed acquisitions.
442
See infra notes 443-50 and accompanying text.
443
See supra Table 9.
444
See supra Table 12.
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capitalization of the target (a proxy for deal size)445 and cash-for-stock
deals (which trigger Revlon duties)446, are controlled for here. And still
other variables that one might associate with cherry-picking—such as
those associated with institutional lead plaintiffs generally, like lowpremium deals—are simply not significantly correlated with an increase
from the offer to the final price.447 Similarly, many of the same variables
that would predict cherry-picking of cases would predict cherry-picking
of deals in which arbitrageurs drive up the price above the offer price.
The premium, the number of bidders, the presence of controlling
shareholders, whether the deal is hostile or friendly, and price changes
prior to the offer have all been used as controls in research on
speculation spreads, as they were here.448 Yet, the result for publicpension funds persists even in the presence of these variables.449 Finally,
as noted earlier, individual and small institutional lead plaintiffs with
weaker cases and less experienced counsel avoid suit in Delaware
because they are unlikely to obtain lead plaintiff and lead counsel
appointments under the Hirt factors.450 Thus, the results here likely
understate the correlation between public-pension lead plaintiffs and case
outcomes like increased price.
Deal structure also plays an important role in increasing share
451
price.
Here, cash-for-stock deals positively and statistically
significantly correlate with improvements in the final price.452 One
possible interpretation of these results is Delaware's favorable legal

445

See supra note 379 and accompanying text.
See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
447
In the case of arbitrageurs, the causation could also run the opposite way—
arbitrageurs could drive up prices because they see or anticipate a public-pension fund (or its
chosen law firm) litigating the case. Also, there simply may not be any correlation between
public-pension-fund litigation activity and arbitrageur activity.
448
See, e.g., Jindra & Walkling, supra note 441, at 516 tbl.6 (controlling for premium,
multiple bidders, blockholders, whether the deal is hostile or friendly, and changes in price
prior to the announcement of the offer, or "runup," in multivariate regressions on speculation
spreads). Note that "runup" and multiple bidders were dropped from the regressions for lack
of significance.
449
See id. at 518.
450
See supra notes 211-14 and accompanying text.
451
See Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Premiums in Stock-for-Stock Mergers and Some
Consequences in the Law of Director Fiduciary Duties, 152 U. PA. L. REV., 881, 883-84
(2003) (discussing that the inability to share in gains as a reason to pay premiums in cash-forstock, but not in stock-for-stock mergers).
452
See supra Table 12.
446
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regime for cash deals.453 Under Revlon, which applies in cash-out
mergers, a board is subjected to enhanced scrutiny and is legally
obligated to maximize share price.454 The Revlon risk faced in cash-outmergers by the target board directly, and by the bidder board for aiding
and abetting a Revlon breach, may explain the bump in price.455 Note that
stock-for-stock deals to do not correlate with such a bump.456
Finally, friendly deals correlate with improved share price.457 In
friendly deals, the bidder board is also subject to suit, usually on the
grounds of aiding and abetting the target board's breaches of fiduciary
duty, as noted above.458 Moreover, because both boards want to
consummate the deal, the acquirer may be more willing to increase its
price.459 In contrast, hostile deals usually involve the bidder board in a de
facto alliance with the target's shareholders against the target board.460 In
such deals, shareholders are litigating to try to force the target board to
accept the bidder's offer, or at least to negotiate with the bidder, so the
bidder may feel less need to increase its offer.461

453

See supra note 278 and accompanying text. But see Bradley R. Aronstam & David
E. Ross, Retracing Delaware's Corporate Roots Through Recent Decisions: Corporate
Foundations Remain Stable While Judicial Standards Of Review Continue To Evolve, 12 DEL.
L. REV. 1, 17 (2010) (noting a need for a "uniform standard" in mergers).
454
See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 180, 182
(Del. 1986) (stating that a company's board faces an enhanced duty to maximize shareholder
value at sale).
455
But see Thompson & Thomas, supra note 4, at 196 (finding no substantial gains for
shareholders in deals subject to transactional litigation when Revlon duties apply, despite the
popular perception that such gains exist).
456
See id. at 147 (finding directors can negotiate a stock-for-stock deal and not trigger
Revlon duties).
457
See supra Table 12.
458
See, e.g., In re Lukens Inc. S'holders Litig., 757 A.2d 720, 734-35 (Del. Ch. 1999)
(evaluating claim of aiding and abetting breach of Revlon duties and stating elements of the
claim), aff'd sub nom. Walker v. Lukens, Inc., 757 A.2d 1278 (Del. 2000).
459
But see Thompson & Thomas, supra note 4, at 206 (finding that premiums proposed
for hostile deals may be substantially higher than those in the friendly deals).
460
See, e.g., Gregory R. Andre, Tender Offers for Corporate Control: A Critical
Analysis and Proposals for Reform, 12 DEL. J. CORP. L. 865, 869, 889-95 (1987) (discussing
target management's desire to retain control of the corporation, often in opposition to target
shareholders' desire to sell their stock at a premium over market); see also Unitrin, Inc. v. Am.
Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1388-91 (Del. 1995) (evaluating acquiring corporation and target
shareholders' claim to enjoin target board's decision to repurchase its own stock in an effort to
thwart the hostile offer); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 952, 954-55
(Del. 1985) (establishing higher level of scrutiny for directors' actions in hostile bid situations
because there is a greater chance directors may not act in shareholders' best interest).
461
See, for example, Unocal, 493 A.2d at 949-51, where the tender offering minority
shareholder filed a complaint to challenge target board's decision to self-tender in response to
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Naturally, whether the deal closes strongly predicts an increase in
price. For this reason, in Model Two I report results only for deals that
close.463 Note that in this Model, only the result of interest stands—the
positive and statistically significant correlation between public-pension
lead plaintiffs and an increase from the offer to the final price.464 This
finding provides some additional support for the contention that publicpension funds do more than just cherry-pick the best cases.465 Only the
presence of these funds correlates with improved price.466
462

B. Top Plaintiff Law Firm Case Characteristics
In Table 13, I assess the case characteristics affiliated with the top
plaintiff law firms by number of appearances (Model One), excluding
local counsel.467 I also assess the case characteristics affiliated with the
top plaintiff law firms by number of appearances and reputation (Model
Two), excluding local counsel.468

the hostile tender offer. For a further example, see Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1385.
462
See, e.g., How Mergers and Acquisitions Affect Stock Prices, supra note 441.
463
See supra Table 12.
464
See supra Table 12.
465
See supra notes 439-42 and accompanying text.
466
See supra Table 12.
467
See infra Table 13.
468
See infra Table 13. These include Milberg, Wolf_Popper,_Schiffrin Barroway,
Lerach Couglin, Bernstein, Liebhard, and Goodkind Labaton.
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Table 13: Case Characteristics Associated with Top Plaintiff Law Firms
(Excluding Local Counsel)

# Complaints
Complaint Length
Friendly
TargetMCAP
Post-Cox

Model One

Model Two

0.497979
(0.000)***
-0.02074
(0.246)
1.21259
(0.0002)***
-0.05944
(0.517)
-0.32289
(0.382)

0.721016
(0.000)***
-0.01895
(0.302)
1.69
(0.000)***
0.026786
(0.94)
-1.30303
(0.001)***

Binary logistic regression with dependent variable dummy for top 5
plaintiff firm. This data is Pre-Lehman and P-values are indicated in
parentheses. *** = 1% confidence; ** = 5% confidence; * = 10%
confidence. Cash-for-stock was dropped as a control variable here
because it was never significant in any model pertaining to plaintiff law
firms. The dependent variable for Models One was the top plaintiff law
firms by number of appearances, excluding Delaware counsel. The
dependent variable for Model Two included the top plaintiff law firms by
number of appearances and by reputation.
Perhaps the most notable result in Table 13 is that the market
capitalization of the target does not significantly correlate with a top
plaintiff law firm.469 Contrary to popular belief, the most active plaintiff
law firms do not simply bring suit in the largest deals.470 Of course, they
do not avoid them either.471 And before congratulating these firms for
their perspicacity in case selection, it is troubling to observe that such
firms negatively correlate with complaint length—they write shorter, less
thoughtful complaints.472 These results are statistically significant for
firms by reputation, and just shy of significant for firms by number of

469

See supra Table 13.
See supra Table 13.
471
See supra Table 13.
472
See supra Table 13.
470
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appearances (though I note that the coefficients here are negative as
well).473 This suggests that the top players are quick filers looking to
grab a case, and not engaging in thoughtful case selection. But there is
an important caveat to this point. The result flips when it is interacted
with an institutional lead plaintiff.474 Thus, in cases in which there is both
an institutional lead plaintiff and a top plaintiff law firm, whether it be by
number of appearances or reputation, complaints are longer.475 Thus, the
top plaintiff law firms write longer complaints for their better clients (or
better cases). In general, though, these firms often sue with individual
lead plaintiffs.476 In unreported regressions, I find that there is no
statistically significant correlation between top law firms and
institutional lead plaintiffs generally, or any particular type of
institution.477
Finally, the post-Cox variable represents cases filed in Delaware
after the Delaware Court of Chancery's decision in In re Cox
Communications Inc., Shareholders Litigation.478 In Cox, then-Vice
Chancellor Strine granted the plaintiffs' lawyers only one-quarter of the
$5 million in requested fees, even though the defendants had consented
to the fees.479 The case was viewed as the first in a series of fee-cutting
cases that some sources have cited for the tendency of some firms to
bring mergers-and-acquisitions cases outside of Delaware.480 Although
this Cox variable was not significant for the most frequent lead counsel
in Delaware mergers-and-acquisitions cases, it does negatively correlate
with elite firms, suggesting that these firms may have taken some of their
business elsewhere in the aftermath of Cox.481

473

See supra Table 13.
See supra Table 13.
475
Pearson correlation between institutional lead plaintiffs interacted with top plaintiff
law firm (appearances) and complaint length is 0.117 with a p-value of 0.082; Pearson
correlation between institutional lead plaintiffs interacted with top plaintiff law firm
(reputation) and complaint length is even stronger, with a coefficient of 0.133 and a p-value of
0.048.
476
See supra Table 13.
477
See supra Table 13.
478
In re Cox Commc'ns Inc., S'holders Litig., 879 A.2d 604 (Del. Ch. 2005).
479
Id. at 648.
480
Armour, Black & Cheffins, Losing, supra note 216, at 648 (hypothesizing that Cox
is a potential cause of certain law firms bringing mergers-and-acquisitions suits outside of
Delaware).
481
See supra Table 13; see also Armour, Black & Cheffins, Losing, supra note 216, at
648.
474
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C. Attorneys' Fees
Table 14 below demonstrates that public-pension funds negatively
correlate with attorneys' fees granted.482 The results are statistically
significant in both models, which vary only by whether one includes the
most frequent law firm participants or just elite law firm participants.483
The regressions control for other factors that might impact attorneys'
fees, including relevant deal characteristics, the target's market
capitalization, the overall market movement, the change in the deal price
subsequent to the offer, if any, and attorney hours worked.484

482

See infra Table 14.
See infra Table 14. For elite law firms, see supra note 468.
484
See infra Table 14.
483
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Table 14: Attorneys' Fees (Natural Log)

Public-Pension
Dummy
Elite Plaintiffs Firms

Model One
-0.14896
(0.018)**
-0.06704
(0.091)*

Top 5 Plaintiff Law
Firms
Friendly
0.05239
(0.175)
Cash-for-Stock
-0.02896
(0.550)
Target Market Cap
0.0042
(0.727)
SPDR Change from 0.1494
Offer to Final
(0.255)
Deal Close
-0.01202
(0.838)
Change from Offer -0.05041
to Final Price
(0.601)
Attorney Hours
1.51E-05
(0.169)
R-squared
24.2%

Model Two
-0.13267
(0.035)**

-0.05896
(0.145)
0.05112
(0.189)
-0.02992
(0.540)
0.00369
(0.761)
0.1677
(0.226)
-0.01965
(0.742)
-0.06551
(0.497)
1.13E-05
(0.309)
23%

OLS regression with dependent variable the natural log of granted
attorneys' fees and expenses. *** = 1% confidence; ** = 5% confidence;
* = 10% confidence.
These results are consistent with the idea that public-pension funds
should be able to bargain for lower attorneys' fees, for several reasons.485
First, because of portfolio monitoring by multiple law firms, the funds
are well positioned to force the firms to compete against one another to

485

See, e.g., Perino, supra note 114, at 384 ("Public pensions that are sophisticated
repeat players should be able to bargain for lower attorney fees than other types of lead
plaintiffs. Plaintiff's attorneys should also be willing to compete for public pension fund
business as a way to increase the likelihood of becoming lead counsel in large and lucrative
class actions.").
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win the lead counsel role.486 They will obtain bids from multiple law
firms to represent them in the case.487 Law firms may be willing to cut
their fees for public-pension-fund clients not only because the firms face
competition, but because the public-pension funds are attractive clients
with large holdings who may become repeat players in litigation.488 The
public-pension funds may also be able to secure lead plaintiff
appointments in larger, higher-stakes cases where the potential fee
awards may be greater in absolute terms, even if they are smaller in
relative terms.489 Trustees who serve on public-pension-funds boards
may also serve as a valuable source of law firm referrals to other publicpension trustees with whom they interact at professional and educational
conferences.490
As with the finding in Table 12 for the change from offer to final
price, only public-pension funds correlate with the outcome of interest, in
this instance, lower attorneys' fees.491 The results in Tables 12 and 14 set
public-pension funds apart from other institutional investors.492 As
discussed more fully below, while I find some evidence that institutional
investors generally appear to be selecting and bringing the cases that, ex
ante, we would want them to, public-pension funds alone correlate with
an improved outcome for shareholders in these cases.493
VII. CONCLUSION
This Article demonstrates that institutions have accepted
Delaware's invitation to serve as lead plaintiffs in transactional class and
derivative actions. It shows that public-pension funds and labor-union
funds have become the leading institutional participants in these cases,
and that public-pension funds in particular correlate with the outcomes of
greatest interest to shareholders: an increase from the offer to the final
price, and lower attorneys' fees. Even taking a restrained and skeptical
view of the evidence presented here, one would still conclude that
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See Rubenstein, supra note 191, at 220 ("MissPERS claims it is able to play each
[monitoring firm] off against the other in terms of determining the fee arrangement.").
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See id.
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See id. at 221.
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See Rubenstein, supra note 191, at 221.
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See supra Table 12.
492
See supra Tables 12, 14.
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See discussion infra Part VII.
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institutional investors are, if little else, cherry-picking the best cases, at
least when their case selection is viewed ex ante. They target larger,
cash-for-stock, low-premium deals, and they correlate with longer
complaints, which reflect greater attorney effort. As noted earlier,
public-pension funds target cases involving controlling shareholders.
From this ex ante perspective, these are the cases one would likely
cherry-pick. Larger deals mean more money at stake for the class, for
the lead plaintiff, and for the attorneys. Cash-for-stock deals trigger
Revlon duties that are favorable to plaintiff shareholders. Lowerpremium deals are more vulnerable to attack because they look like the
acquirer is underpaying for the target. And controlling-shareholder
transactions trigger acute concerns about exploitation of inside
information by company insiders to favorably time an acquisition at the
expense of minority shareholders. Thus, institutions target cases with
more dollars at stake, less attractive deal characteristics, and legal
remedies available to redress the transactions' shortcomings—the same
cases any rational plaintiff would target.
Even if we conclude that the funds cherry-pick the best cases and
add no other value, this may be enough to justify the policy favoring the
selection of institutional lead plaintiffs, at least insofar as they cherrypick the best cases, and not merely deals in which arbitrageurs would
drive up the price anyway. If nothing else, under the cherry-picking
theory, institutional investors serve as an early screen of case quality.
Simply by agreeing to serve as a lead plaintiff, they send a signal of case
quality to the market, to the defendants, to the court, and to the class of
shareholders that they represent. This point is brought into relief when
one recalls that the data could have come out differently. For example, it
is possible that there could have been no correlation between case
characteristics and institutional lead plaintiffs, suggesting haphazard and
thoughtless case selection, or case selection that correlated only with the
interests of attorneys, not shareholders.
But some of the evidence suggests that institutional investors do
more than cherry-pick. Even accounting for deal characteristics
associated with cherry-picking of either cases or deals in which
arbitrageurs would drive up the price, public-pension funds correlate
with an improvement from the offer price to the final price. As discussed
above, this could be because public-pension funds are superior litigators,
or that defendants are more willing to capitulate to their demands even if
they are not actually better litigators. Moreover, this Article presents
evidence that institutional investors, particularly public-pension funds,
exercise independent judgment both when selecting and when
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monitoring their lawyers. Most importantly, public-pension funds
correlate with lower attorneys' fees, suggesting more active monitoring
of class counsel.
At a minimum, then, Delaware's policy favoring the selection of
institutional-investor lead plaintiffs appears to be working, at least
because institutions do seem to cherry-pick the best cases, which is itself
of value as an early indicator of case quality. This Article also offers
some empirical support for the view that public-pension funds, in
particular, improve outcomes for shareholders for reasons that may go
beyond cherry-picking and that are at least partially attributable to the
funds themselves: their litigation skills, their reputation, their monitoring
of class counsel, or all three.

